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Split Chords: Addressing the Federal Circuit Split in Music Sampling Copyright
Infringement Cases
Abstract
This Note offers a comprehensive analysis of the current circuit split regarding how the de minimis
doctrine applies to music sampling in copyright infringement cases. Since the Sixth Circuit's 2005
landmark decision in Bridgeport Music Inc. v. Dimension Films, critics, scholars and even judges have
dissected the opinion and its bright line rule of “get a license or do not sample.” In May 2016, the Ninth
Circuit issued its opinion in VMG Salsoul v. Ciccione. The Ninth Circuit explicitly declined to follow
Bridgeport, holding that analyzing a music sampling copyright infringement case requires a substantial
similarity analysis, including applying a de minimis analysis.
The Ninth Circuit’s decision created a circuit split and an unsettled area of intellectual property law. This
Note seeks to promote critical analysis of this contested area of law by exploring the underpinnings of the
substantial similarity and de minimis doctrines, as well as the holdings of each case and their arguments.
The Note offers three proposals regarding how courts should handle the circuit split, and in doing so
creates a distinctive way of looking at the music sampling issue to help the federal judiciary frame the
problem in a more expansive way.
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INTRODUCTION
In 1990, hip-hop artist Vanilla Ice released his song “Ice Ice Baby”
in the United States and it quickly became a hit, giving hip-hop its first
number one song atop the Billboard “Hot 100” chart.1 Before long,
however, the song stirred up a controversy rivaling its popularity due to
Vanilla Ice’s “sampling” of the bass line from Queen and David Bowie’s
1981 hit “Under Pressure.”2 Vanilla Ice did not acquire a license or
permission from the “Under Pressure” artists and did not give them any
songwriting credits as required under copyright law.3 Shortly after the
1

Billboard Charts Archive, the Top 100 – 1990, BILLBOARD,
http://www.billboard.com/archive/charts/1990/hot-100 (last visited Sept. 24, 2016); Steve
Huey, To The Extreme, ALLMUSIC, http://www.allmusic.com/album/to-the-extrememw0000316695 (last visited Sept. 24, 2016); Joe Lynch, 8 Songs Accused of Plagiarism
that Hit No. 1 on the Billboard Hot 100, BILLBOARD,
http://www.billboard.com/articles/news/list/6501950/songs-accused-plagiarism-no-1-hot100-blurred-lines (last visited Sept. 24, 2016); Mim Udovitch, To The Extreme, ENT.
WKLY., http://www.ew.com/article/1990/11/02/extreme (last visited Sept. 24,
2016);Vanilla Ice’s real name is Rob Van Winkle. Kevin Stillman, ‘Word to Your Mother,’
IOWA ST. DAILY, http://www.iowastatedaily.com/news/article_766d27d2-dc56-5ff3-904047e44d46094f.html (last visited Sept. 24, 2016).
2
See Eric Arnum, Digital Flashback: Samplers Run Amok, MTV,
http://www.mtv.com/news/620408/digital-flashback-samplers-run-amok (last visited Sept.
24, 2016); Famous Copyright Infringement Cases in Music, WEINHAUS & POTASHNICK,
http://www.fairwagelawyers.com/most-famous-music-copyright-infringment.html
(last
visited Sept. 24, 2016); Peter Relic, The 25 Most Notorious Uncleared Samples in Rap
History, COMPLEX MAG., http://www.complex.com/music/2013/04/the-25-most-notoriousuncleared-samples-in-rap-history/vanilla-ice-ice-ice-baby-sampling-david-bowie-and (last
visited Sept. 24, 2016); Matthew Yglesias, Was Paul’s Boutique Illegal?, SLATE MAG.,
http://www.slate.com/articles/business/moneybox/2012/05/adam_yauch_and_paul_s_bouti
que_how_dumb_court_decisions_have_made_it_nearly_impossible_for_artists_to_sample
_the_way_the_beastie_boys_did.html (last visited Sept. 24, 2016).
3
See ROGER L. SADLER, ELECTRONIC MEDIA LAW 309 (Sage Publ’ns 2005); Alex
Holz, How You Can Clear Cover Songs, Samples, and Handle Public Domain Works, AM.
SOC’Y OF COMPOSERS, AUTHORS AND PUBLISHERS,
http://www.ascap.com/playback/2011/01/features/limelight.aspx (last visited Sept. 24,
2016); Rich Stim, When You Need Permission to Sample Others' Music, NOLO,
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controversy erupted, Vanilla Ice told MTV in a 1990 interview that the bass
lines from “Ice Ice Baby” and “Under Pressure” were actually different
because he had added in a single extra beat.4 But within months, Queen and
Bowie threatened to sue the young rapper for copyright infringement,5 and
the matter eventually settled out-of-court.6 The “Ice Ice Baby” incident was
one of the first major music sampling controversies, but over the next
fifteen years, dozens of musicians faced similar lawsuits or threats of suit
for copyright infringement.7

http://www.nolo.com/legal-encyclopedia/permission-sampled-music-sample-clearance30165.html (last visited Sept. 24, 2016).
4
Luke Davis, Throwback Thursday: Vanilla Ice Denying he Ripped Off “Under
Pressure,” SAMPLEFACE, http://www.sampleface.co.uk/vanilla-ice-denying-he-ripped-offunder-pressure/ (last visited Sept. 24, 2016). (Van Winkle later said in an interview with a
reporter from the Iowa State Daily that he was joking during the 1990 interview with MTV
when he tried to distinguish the bass line of “Ice Ice Baby” from “Under Pressure.”
Whether or not he was actually joking in the 1990 interview is debatable.)
5
SADLER, supra note 3, at 309; Famous Copyright Infringement Cases in Music,
WEINHAUS & POTASHNICK, http://www.fairwagelawyers.com/most-famous-musiccopyright-infringment.html (last visited Sept. 24, 2016); Jordan Runtagh, Songs on Trial:
10 Landmark Music Copyright Cases, ROLLING STONE,
http://www.rollingstone.com/music/lists/songs-on-trial-10-landmark-music-copyrightcases-20160608/vanilla-ice-vs-queen-and-david-bowie-1990-20160608 (last visited Sept.
24, 2016).
6
SADLER, supra note 3, at 309; Famous Copyright Infringement Cases in Music,
WEINHAUS & POTASHNICK, supra note 5; Runtagh, supra note 5. (According to Van
Winkle in an interview with an Iowa newspaper, the artist allegedly settled the case for $4
million. Stillman, supra note 1.)
7
Justin Charity, 9 Legal Battles Between Rappers and the Artists They Sampled,
COMPLEX MAG., http://www.complex.com/music/2014/09/how-many-emcees-must-getsued/gold-digger (last vistied Nov. 5, 2016). (There have been several prominent cases in
the last two decades where popular musicians and groups have been sued regarding
unauthorized music sampling, including Jay Z for his hit “Big Pimpin,” Kayne West for
“Gold Digger,” and most recently, Justin Bieber and the DJ Skrillex, who were sued in
2016 for alleged sampling in their hit song “Sorry.”) See Steward v. West, No. 13-02449,
2014 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 186012, *25–27 (C.D. Cal. Aug. 14, 2014); Daniel Kreps, Justin
Bieber,
Skrillex
Sued
Over
‘Sorry’
Hook,
ROLLING
STONE,
http://www.rollingstone.com/music/news/justin-bieber-skrillex-sued-over-sorry-hook20160527 (last visited Sept. 24, 2016); Ben Sisario, Jay Z and Timbaland Win Copyright
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In 2005, the standard for copyright infringement in music sampling
cases appeared to shift to a strict, bright line rule when the Sixth Circuit
Court of Appeals rejected the use of a “substantial similarity” test in the
landmark decision Bridgeport Music Inc. v. Dimension Films and held that
any unauthorized sampling of a sound recording was grounds for copyright
infringement.8 The decision cut against long-standing principles of
copyright law which dictated that in infringement cases courts must perform
a substantial similarity analysis, and by natural extension must consider the
defense of de minimis non curat lex, or simply de minimis.9

Lawsuit
Over
‘Big
Pimpin’
Sample,
THE
NEW
YORK
TIMES,
http://www.nytimes.com/2015/10/22/business/media/jay-z-and-timbaland-win-copyrightlawsuit-over-big-pimpin-sample.html?_r=0 (last visited Sept. 24, 2016). (Another
notorious example that happened around the same time as “Ice Ice Baby” was MC
Hammer’s “You Can’t Touch This,” which sampled the base line from Rick James’ song
“Superfreak”; that case also settled out-of-court when Hammer (real name Stanley Burrell)
agreed to give James a songwriting credit (which would also entitle him to royalties).) See
Kenneth Partridge, ‘U Can’t Touch This’ at 25: Remembering MC Hammer’s
Breakthrough Single, BILLBOARD, http://www.billboard.com/articles/columns/thejuice/6436624/u-cant-touch-this-25-anniversary-mc-hammer (last visited Sept. 24, 2016);
Randy
Reiss,
Rick
James
Undergoes
Physical
Rehab,
MTV,
http://www.mtv.com/news/503519/rick-james-undergoes-physical-rehab/ (last visited Sept.
24, 2016); Pat Pemberton, U Can’t Touch This, ROLLING STONE,
http://www.rollingstone.com/music/news/u-can-t-touch-this-mc-hammer (last visited Sept.
24, 2016).
8
See Bridgeport Music, Inc. v. Dimension Films, 410 F.3d 792, 801–05 (6th Cir.
2005) (finding the de minimis defense did not apply to sound recordings under federal
copyright law and any unauthorized copying of sampled music, no matter how small or
insignificant, could constitute copyright infringement.)
9
Mike Suppappola, Confusion in the Digital Age: Why the De Minimis Use Test
Should be Applied to Digital Samples of Copyrighted Sound Recordings, 14 TEX. INTELL.
PROP. L.J., 93, 98–99 (2006). (The author notes:
The principle that trivial copying does not constitute actionable
infringement has long been a central tenet of copyright law. Indeed,
Judge Learned Hand observed over 80 years ago that “[s]ome copying is
permitted. In addition to copying, it must be shown that this has been
done to an unfair extent.” “This principle reflects the legal maxim, de
minimis non curatlex . . . .” “De minimis use means that a copying ‘has
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Though the Sixth Circuit’s Bridgeport standard stood unchallenged
by its sister circuits for more than a decade, critics derided the opinion10 and
some lower courts outright declined to follow it.11 In June 2016, Madonna’s
(real name Madonna Louise Ciccone) hit song “Vogue” brought the

occurred to such a trivial extent as to fall below the quantitative [and
qualitative] threshold of substantial similarity . . . .’”)
Id. The term de minimis non curatlex, or de minimis for short, is often translated as,
“the law does not concern itself with trifles.” BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY (10th ed. 2014);
See also Feist Publ'ns, Inc. v. Rural Tel. Serv. Co., 499 U.S. 340, 363 (1991). (holding that
the selection, coordination, and arrangement of respondent's white pages constituted a “de
minimis quantum of creativity” and thus did not satisfy the minimum constitutional
standards for copyright protection); See Also Newton v. Diamond, 388 F.3d 1189, 1192–95
(9th Cir. 2004) (finding the Beastie Boys’ use of a six-second, three-note flute segment of
plaintiff’s musical composition was de minimis and therefore not actionable as a matter of
law).
10
4 MELVILLE B. NIMMER & DAVID NIMMER, NIMMER ON COPYRIGHT § 13.03
[A][2][b] (2015); Mark R. Carter, Applying the Fragmented Literal Similarity Test to
Musical-Work and Sound-Recording Infringement: Correcting the Bridgeport Music, Inc.
v. Dimension Films Legacy, 14 MINN. J.L. SCI. & TECH. 669, 681–84 (2013) (criticizing the
Bridgeport holding and proposing the use of the Fragmented Literal Similarity Test as the
standard for sound recording infringement cases); Julie Cromer, Harry Potter and the
Three-Second Crime: Are We Vanishing the De Minimis Doctrine from Copyright Law?,
36 N. M. L. REV. 261, 283 (2006) (arguing that the “Sixth Circuit’s blanket disregard for
substantial similarity or a de minimis test is not only improper but reckless”); Michael Jude
Galvin, Bright Line at Any Cost: The Sixth Circuit Unjustifiably Weakens the Protection
for Musical Composition Copyrights in Bridgeport Music v. Dimension Films, 9 VAND. J.
ENT. & TECH. L. 529, 539 (2007) (criticizing the Bridgeport holding and asserting that the
Sixth Circuit “should have affirmed the decision of the district court and dismissed the
plaintiff’s infringement claim”); John Schietinger, Bridgeport Music, Inc. v. Dimension
Films: How the Sixth Circuit Missed a Beat on Digital Music Sampling, 55 DEPAUL L.
REV. 209, 210 (2005) (criticizing the Bridgeport holding as “problematic and potentially
harmful”).
11
Steward v. West, No. 13-02449, 2014 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 186012 at *25–27 (C.D.
Cal. Aug. 14, 2014) (noting that Bridgeport “has been criticized by courts and
commentators alike” and declining to follow its holding); Batiste v. Najm, 28 F. Supp. 3d
595, 625 n.52 (E.D. La. 2014) (noting Bridgeport’s holding and declining to follow);
Saregama India Ltd. v. Mosley, 687 F. Supp. 2d 1325, 1338–41 (S.D. Fla. 2009) (explicitly
declining to follow Bridgeport’s holding, finding that Bridgeport’s statutory interpretation
was flawed and that the Bridgeport court’s “policy prescriptions, however accurate they
may be, do not present grounds for this Court to follow its direction”); EMI Records Ltd. v.
Premise Media Corp. L.P., 2008 N.Y. Misc. LEXIS 7485 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. Aug. 8, 2008)
(explicitly declining to follow the statutory interpretation “relied upon by the court in
Bridgeport Music to declare the bright line rule that a de minimis exception is not
available”).
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Bridgeport opinion back into the public sphere.12 In VMG Salsoul v.
Ciccione, the Federal Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit addressed
whether a 0.23 second piece of audio allegedly sampled from an earlier
disco song and reused in Madonna’s “Vogue” constituted infringement.13
The Court’s opinion directly rejected the reasoning of Bridgeport, holding
that a substantial similarity test must be used, and the de minimis defense
does apply in music sampling cases.14 This created a circuit split and an
inconsistent rule of law at the federal appellate level.15
This Note addresses the conflict in the Federal Circuit Courts
regarding the interpretation of copyright law and whether substantial
similarity, the de minimis defense, and the “fair use” defense should be
available in music sampling cases. Part I of the note discusses the evolution
of music sampling and copyright infringement cases which have defined the
area. Part II addresses the recently created circuit split, analyzes the
arguments made by each court and discusses the merits, potential
ramifications and policy implications of each view. Part III will propose
how the circuit split should be resolved and will provide another method

12

VMG Salsoul, LLC v. Ciccone, 824 F.3d 871 (9th Cir. 2016); see Madona’s
‘Vogue’ Didn’t Infringe Disco Song, 84 U.S.L.W. 1826 (2016).
13
VMG Salsoul, LLC, 824 F.3d at 874.
14
Id. at 880-88.
15
Id. at 886; see Madona’s ‘Vogue’ Didn’t Infringe Disco Song, 84 U.S.L.W. 1826
(2016).
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courts may use to analyze music sampling cases in order to give effect to
the legislative interests of copyright law.
I. BACKGROUND
The origins of music sampling date back to the nineteenth century,16
but the type of sampling discussed in both Bridgeport and VMG Salsoul17
dates back only to the mid-twentieth century.18 Sampling did not become a
popular technique in the music industry until the 1980’s, when hip-hop and
rap musicians began sampling segments of their own and others’ work, like
drums beats and bass lines, and reusing them in other songs.19 Almost
immediately, this relatively new technique of music sampling began posing
legal problems for artists who wanted to use it.20

16

Hugh Davies, A History of Sampling, 1 J. ORGANISED SOUND 3, 10 (1996).
See VMG Salsoul, 824 F.3d at 874 and Bridgeport Music, Inc. v. Dimension
Films, 410 F.3d 792, 801–05 (6th Cir. 2005) (the type of music sampling discussed in this
note is narrowly focused on sampling where an artist or producer uses a piece of equipment
(initially a “sampler” machine, but now more commonly software programs on computers)
to copy a piece or segment of already-recorded music and insert it, either unedited or after
it has been modified, into another musical work); see also SADLER, supra note 3, at 309,
Digital Music Sampling: Creativity or Criminality?, NAT’L PUBLIC RADIO (Jan. 28, 2011,
1:00 PM), http://www.npr.org/templates/transcript/transcript.php?storyId=133306353, Jane
McGrath, How Music Sampling Works, HOW STUFF WORKS (Sept. 24, 2016),
http://entertainment.howstuffworks.com/music-sampling1.htm (since about the 1970’s,
sampling has generally referred to “‘the method by which special musical instruments or
apparatus digitally ‘record’ external sounds’ for later playback. Playback usually consists
of either simply pressing a button, or key, to recall a recorded sample or programming a
music sequencer to trigger a sample automatically within a predetermined arrangement of
samples”), Michael Allyn Pote, Mashed-up in Between: The Delicate Balance of Artists'
Interests Lost amidst the War on Copyright, 88 N.C. L. REV. 639, 643–44 (2010).
18
See Davies, supra note 16, at 10.
19
Pote, supra note 17, at 645; see also JOSEPH G. SCHLOSS, MUSIC CULTURE:
MAKING BEATS: THE ART OF SAMPLE-BASED HIP-HOP, 35–40 (Wesleyan Univ. Press
2014).
20
See, e.g., Grand Upright Music, Ltd. v. Warner Bros. Records, 780 F. Supp. 182,
183–85 (S.D.N.Y. 1991) (holding that defendants, including rapper Marcel Theo Hall, also
17
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These problems began to arise in part because the innovate new
technology raised questions as to how copyright law protected these
sampled pieces of music, and later because of the complex and often
expensive nature of the licensing process which developed—what has now
become known in the music industry as “sample clearing,” the process a
musician uses to obtain a license to sample a portion of another artist’s
work in their own song.21 The process of “sample clearing” essentially
amounts to getting authorization from and providing compensation to the
copyright holder of the original work.22 But because copyrights exist for
both the underlying musical composition of the song, as well as the actual
sound recording of the song,23 this usually requires the sampling artist to get
“clearance” from two, sometimes separate, entities: the copyright owner of

known as “Biz Markie,” intentionally violated plaintiff’s rights by using three words from
plaintiff's song and sampling a portion of the plaintiff’s master recording without
permission on defendant’s album “I Need a Haircut”), Michaelangelo Matos, How
M/A/R/R/S ‘Pump Up The Volume’ Became Dance Music’s First Pop Hit, ROLLING STONE
(July 14, 2016), http://www.rollingstone.com/music/features/how-m-a-r-r-s-pump-up-thevolume-became-dance-musics-first-pop-hit-20160714, Relic, supra note 2, Jeremy
Mersereau, 10 Artists Who Were Sued For Unauthorized Samples, AUX TV (Nov. 10,
2015), http://www.aux.tv/2015/11/10-artists-who-were-sued-for-unauthorized-samples/. By
the end of the 1980’s, several hip-hop, rap and dance music artists were already getting into
legal trouble for unauthorized sampling in their music. See Grand Upright Music, Ltd. v.
Warner Bros. Records, 780 F. Supp. 182 (S.D.N.Y. 1991); Mersereau, supra; Relic, supra
note 2.
21
Kembrew McLeod and Peter DiCola, CREATIVE LICENSE: THE LAW AND
CULTURE OF DIGITAL SAMPLING 77–78 (Duke Univ. Press Books 2011).
22
See Holz, supra note 3, Stim, supra note 3; see also Guide to Sample Clearance
for Producers, COMPLEX MAG. (June 27, 2013),
http://www.complex.com/music/2013/06/guide-to-sample-clearance-for-producers/.
23
See SADLER, supra note 3, at 309, Holz, supra note 3, Stim, supra note 3.
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the song’s musical composition and the copyright owner of the master tape
of the sound recording.24
The copyright holder will normally ask for either a flat fee,
songwriting credit with royalties, or some other type of compensation for
use of the sampled work.25 If a copyrighted piece of recorded music is
sampled and then used in another work without proper authorization, the
owner of either copyright may bring an infringement lawsuit against the
offending party.26 While some sampling artists like the Beastie Boys have
gotten into trouble for getting only one of the two licenses required for
sampling,27 others, like Vanilla Ice, did not attempt to get licenses for the
samples they used at all.28

24

See Jimmy Ness, The Queen of Sample Clearance: An Interview With Deborah
Mannis-Gardner,
FORBES
(Feb.
19,
2016,
8:00
AM),
http://www.forbes.com/sites/passionoftheweiss/2016/02/19/the-queen-of-sample-clearancean-interview-with-deborah-mannis-gardner/#5390b6cc412f, Stim, supra note 3, Guide to
Sample Clearance for Producers, supra note 22 (thus, there is copyright protection for both
the underlying musical composition—the notes to be played and their arrangement—and
the actual recording of the composition when the musicians play the composition and “fix
it in the medium” by recording it onto a tape or electronically onto a storage device).
25
See SADLER, supra note 3, at 309; Holz, supra note 3; Stim, supra note 3. A
songwriting credit is not just an acknowledgement of credit or thanks, it normally also
entitles the credited artist to a portion of the fees or “royalties” for the song in the future.
Catherine L. Fisk, Credit Where It's Due: The Law and Norms of Attribution, 95 GEO. L.J.
49, 80 (2006).
26
See SADLER, supra note, 3 at 309; Holz, supra note 3; Stim, supra note 3.
27
See Newton v. Diamond, 388 F.3d 1189, 1191 (9th Cir. 2004) (noting that the
Beastie Boys obtained a sampling license for the sound recording at issue but failed to
obtain the proper license for the underlying musical composition).
28
See Famous Copyright Infringement Cases in Music supra note 2; Relic, supra
note 3.
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The standards for federal copyright law are set out in the Copyright
Act of 1976.29 Under the body of case law interpreting the federal Copyright
Act, in order for a plaintiff to prove infringement, she must establish three
essential elements: (1) ownership of a valid copyright; (2), a copying; (3)
“of constituent elements of the work that are original.”30 Assuming the
plaintiff can satisfy the first element by showing ownership, in order for the
defendant’s use to constitute infringement the plaintiff must also
demonstrate that her work was copied by the defendant, and under the third
prong, long-standing copyright principles dictate that the plaintiff must also
prove that the copied portion was original, and that the defendant copied a
legally significant portion of it.31 In other words, if defendant Artist A is
sued for copying the work of plaintiff Artist B, then Artist B must show:
29

17 U.S.C. §§ 101-810 (2016); NIMMER & NIMMER supra note 10 at § 1-OV.
Feist 499 U.S. at 363 (1991) (holding that the selection, coordination, and
arrangement of respondent's white pages did not satisfy the minimum constitutional
standards for copyright protection); Newton 388 F.3d at 1192–95 (finding the defendant’s
use of a six-second, three-note flute segment of plaintiff’s musical composition was de
minimis and did not satisfy the minimum constitutional standards for copyright protection
and therefore not actionable as a matter of law); Leigh v. Warner Bros., 212 F.3d 1210,
1214 (11th Cir. 2000) (“Even in the rare case of a plaintiff with direct evidence that a
defendant attempted to appropriate his original expression, there is no infringement unless
the defendant succeeded to a meaningful degree.”); Sid & Marty Krofft TV Prods. v.
McDonald's Corp., 562 F.2d 1157, 1167 (9th Cir. 1977) (using “total concept and feel”
variant of substantial similarity test to find defendants had infringed on plaintiff’s
copyright); NIMMER & NIMMER supra note 10 at § 13.03 [A].
31
See Newton 388 F.3d at 1192–95 (using the substantial similarity test to determine
the defendant’s use of a six-second, three-note flute segment of plaintiff’s musical
composition was de minimis and did not satisfy the minimum constitutional standards for
copyright protection and therefore not actionable as a matter of law); Leigh, 212 F.3d at
1215 (finding defendant’s film sequence not substantially similar to plaintiff’s work as a
matter of law); Sid & Marty Krofft TV Prods., 562 F.2d at 1167 (using “total concept and
feel” variant of substantial similarity test to find defendants had infringed on plaintiff’s
copyright); see also NIMMER & NIMMER supra note 10 at § 13.03 [A].
30
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Artist A copied her work, that her work was original enough to warrant
copyright protection, and that Artist A has taken and reused a legally
significant portion of the work.32 Thus, even if the defendant admits she has
copied the plaintiff’s work, the plaintiff must still show that the work is
eligible for copyright protection and that the defendant has copied a legally
significant portion of it.33
A core test for determining whether there has been a legally
significant infringement is the substantial similarity test.34 A long line of
cases have recognized the concept of substantial similarity as being a basic
tenant of copyright protection, dating all the way back to the 19th Century.35

32

NIMMER & NIMMER supra note 10 at § 13.03 [A].
Id. See also Galvin, supra note 10 at 531; Schietinger supra note 10 at 218–19.
34
See NIMMER & NIMMER supra note 10 at § 13.03 [A] [1]-[4]; Galvin, supra note
10 at 531; Schietinger supra note 10 at 218–19. See also Jason E. Sloan, An Overview of
the Elements of a Copyright Infringement Cause of Action - Part II: Improper
Appropriation, AM. BAR ASS’N
http://www.americanbar.org/groups/young_lawyers/publications/the_101_201_practice_ser
ies/part_2_elements_of_a_copyright.html (last visited Sept. 24, 2016).
35
See Folsom v. Marsh, 9 F. Cas. 342, 348 (C.C.D. Mass. 1841). Justice Joseph
Story explained that while the entire work need not have been appropriated to trigger
copyright infringement liability, a significant portion must have been copied, writing:
It is certainly not necessary, to constitute an invasion of copyright,
that the whole of a work should be copied, or even a large portion of it, in
form or in substance. If so much is taken, that the value of the original is
sensibly diminished, or the labors of the original author are substantially
to an injurious extent appropriated by another, that is sufficient, in point
of law, to constitute a piracy pro tanto.
Id. (emphasis added). See also Perris v. Hexamer, 99 U.S. 674, 676–78 (1878) (“A
copyright gives the author or the publisher the exclusive right of multiplying copies of what
he has written or printed. It follows that to infringe this right a substantial copy of the
whole or of a material part must be produced.”) (emphasis added); Dymow v. Bolton, 11
F.2d 690, 692(2d Cir. 1926) (“But an examination of that and other cases will show that the
inquiry actually made was always to ascertain what had been appropriated, if anything, and
then decide whether the appropriation was (1) of copyrightable matter, and (2) was
substantial.”) (emphasis added).
33
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Ultimately, the substantial similarity test seeks to determine whether there is
a significant likeness between the alleged infringing work and the original
copyrighted work, both quantitatively and qualitatively.36 While there are
different variations of the substantial similarity test,37 one of the keys to the
test used most often by courts is whether the allegedly infringing work is
recognizable to an average audience member.38 As the Ninth Circuit
explains: “If the public does not recognize the appropriation, then the copier
has not benefitted from the original artist's expressive content. Accordingly,
there is no infringement.”39
However, a threshold issue of the “substantial similarity” test is
whether the infringement is actionable at all: if the portion of the work
copied is legally insignificant, it will not sustain a cause of action for

36

See NIMMER & NIMMER supra note 10 at § 13.03 [A]. As professor David Nimmer
points out, there is a subtle, yet critical distinction between what is normally termed
“probative similarity,” a factual offer that a work has been copied (i.e. did the defendant
literally take portions of the original copyrighted work), and “substantial similarity,” which
seeks to determine if the alleged infringement has copied a legally “significant” portion of
the work. Id. Despite its obvious-sounding name, it is important to note the subtly and
complexity of the various versions of the substantial similarity test, of which Nimmer
writes, “The determination of the extent of similarity that will constitute a substantial, and
hence infringing, similarity presents one of the most difficult questions in copyright law.”
Id.
37
See NIMMER & NIMMER supra note 10 at § 13.03 [A] [1]-[4]. See also Carter
supra note 10 at 677; Sloan, supra note 34.
38
See NIMMER & NIMMER supra note 10 at § 13.03 [E][1], § 13.03 [A]. This is the
so-called “audience test.” NIMMER & NIMMER supra note 10 at § 13.03 [E][1]. Looking at
this version of the substantial similarity test, the comparison is not made simply in terms of
literal similarity between the two works, but also whether the alleged infringing work is so
similar that an average listener might recognize it, or mistake it for the original copyrighted
work. NIMMER & NIMMER supra note 10 at § 13.03 [A], § 13.03 [E][1]. See also Carter
supra note 10 at 677.
39
VMG Salsoul, LLC v. Ciccone, 824 F.3d 871, 881 (9th Cir. 2016).
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infringement.40 Courts normally apply the concept of de minimis to
determine if the alleged infringement is actionable as a matter of law.41 If
the legal standard of substantial similarity is not met, then the court may
dismiss the case as de minimis, usually on a motion to dismiss, summary
judgment or judgment as a matter of law, before it reaches a jury.42 As an
example, one test applied by the Ninth Circuit in Fisher v. Dees holds that
the use of a piece of music or other work is considered de minimis, or not
“substantial” enough to be actionable, “only if it is so meager and
40

See Newton v. Diamond, 388 F.3d 1189, 1192–93 (9th Cir. 2004) (dismissing
plaintiff’s case on summary judgment because the defendant’s use of a six-second, threenote flute segment of plaintiff’s musical composition was de minimis and did not satisfy the
minimum constitutional standards for copyright protection); Ringgold v. Black
Entertainment TV, Inc., 126 F.3d 70, 74 (2d Cir. 1997) (noting that “de minimis can mean
that copying has occurred to such a trivial extent as to fall below the quantitative threshold
of substantial similarity, which is always a required element of actionable copying”);
NIMMER & NIMMER supra note 10 at § 13.03 [A][2][a].
41
See Feist Publ'ns, Inc. v. Rural Tel. Serv. Co., 499 U.S. 340, 363 (1991) (holding
that the selection, coordination, and arrangement of respondent's white pages did not
satisfy the minimum constitutional standards for copyright protection); Newton, 388 F.3d at
1192–95 (holding that the defendant’s use of a six-second, three-note flute segment of
plaintiff’s musical composition was de minimis and did not satisfy the minimum
constitutional standards for copyright protection and therefore not actionable as a matter of
law); Saregama India Ltd. v. Mosley, 687 F. Supp. 2d 1325, 1337–1338 (S.D. Fla. 2009)
(finding that the defendant’s alleged use of a two-second piece of plaintiff’s work was not
substantially similar and granting summary judgment to the defendant on that issue);
NIMMER & NIMMER supra note 10 at § 13.03[A].
42
See, e.g., Lil' Joe Wein Music, Inc. v. Jackson, 245 Fed. Appx. 873, 880 (11th Cir.
2007) (dismissing plaintiff’s case on summary judgment in part because the alleged
infringement was de minimis and “[n]o reasonable jury, properly instructed, could conclude
that Lil' Joe Wein's and the Defendants' compositions are substantially similar”); Newton,
388 F.3d at 1192–95 (dismissing plaintiff’s case on summary judgment because the
defendant’s use of a six-second, three-note flute segment of plaintiff’s musical composition
was de minimis and did not satisfy the minimum constitutional standards for copyright
protection); Steward, 2014 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 186012, *25–27 (C.D. Cal. Aug. 14, 2014)
(ruling in favor of defendant’s motion for judgment on the pleadings because defendant’s
alleged infringement was de minimis); Saregama India Ltd., 687 F. Supp. 2d at 1338–41
(finding that the defendant’s alleged use of a two-second piece of plaintiff’s work lacked
substantial similarity, was de minimis, and granting summary judgment to the defendant on
that issue).
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fragmentary that the average audience would not recognize the
appropriation.”43 Thus, the concept of de minimis has historically been used
as a defense by alleged infringers to argue that their copying is not legally
significant enough to be actionable.44
In addition to the principle of de minimis, another potential defense
available to a musician being sued for copyright infringement is the doctrine
of “fair use.”45 Fair use is an affirmative defense which can only be used
once substantial similarity between the original and alleged infringing work
has been established.46 Thus, fair use can be an alternative or fallback

43

Fisher v. Dees, 794 F.2d 432, 434 n.2 (9th Cir. 1986).
See, e.g., Lil' Joe Wein Music, 245 Fed. Appx. at 880 (dismissing plaintiff’s case
on summary judgment in part because the alleged infringement was de minimis and “[n]o
reasonable jury, properly instructed, could conclude that Lil' Joe Wein's and the
Defendants' compositions are substantially similar”); Newton, 388 F.3d at 1192–95
(dismissing plaintiff’s case on summary judgment because the defendant’s use of a sixsecond, three-note flute segment of plaintiff’s musical composition was de minimis and did
not satisfy the minimum constitutional standards for copyright protection); Steward, 2014
U.S. Dist. LEXIS 186012 at *25–27 (C.D. Cal. Aug. 14, 2014) (ruling in favor of
defendant’s motion for judgment on the pleadings because defendant’s alleged
infringement was de minimis); Saregama India Ltd., 687 F. Supp. 2d at 1338–41 (finding
that the defendant’s alleged use of a two-second piece of plaintiff’s work lacked substantial
similarity, was de minimis, and granting summary judgment to the defendant on that issue).
45
See NIMMER & NIMMER supra note 10; see also A. D. Johnson, Music Copyrights:
The Need for an Appropriate Fair Use Analysis in Digital Sampling Infringement Suits, 21
FLA. ST. U. L. REV. 135, 138 (1993) (arguing that the fair use doctrine “should remain a
viable defense to claims that sampling constitutes copyright infringement”); Michael B.
Landau, Are the Courts Singing a Different Tune When it Comes to Music? What Ever
Happened to Fair Use in Music Sampling Cases? 5 IP THEORY 1, 17–18 (2015) (arguing
that the fair use doctrine should be used in music sampling cases and that the Compulsory
License in Section 115 of the Copyright Act should be expanded to include music sampling
under the fair use exception).
46
Schietinger, supra note 10 at 220. “Fair Use” is an affirmative defense which
recognizes a legally significant portion of the work has been copied, but that copying is
excused under the doctrine of “Fair Use,” which is statutorily built into the Copyright Act.
Id.
44
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argument for a defendant if the de minimis defense fails.47 The doctrine has
a long and somewhat complicated history, but recent decisions and
scholarship suggest that it could be applicable to music sampling cases.48
Fair use in a copyright infringement action must be determined on a caseby-case basis using a four-factor test enumerated in § 107 of the Copyright
Act of 1976.49
How the copyright principles of substantial similarity, de minimis
and fair use apply to music sampling has been the subject of debate in
recent years.50 In situations like Vanilla Ice’s “Ice Ice Baby,” where the

47

Carter, supra note 10.
See Landau, supra note 45, at 17–18 (arguing that the fair use doctrine should be
used in music sampling cases and that the Compulsory License in Section 115 of the
Copyright Act should be expanded to include music sampling under the fair use exception).
See also Cariou v. Prince, 714 F.3d 694, 705 (2d Cir. 2013) (holding that under the fair use
doctrine there is no requirement that new work must make a comment on the old work or
author, only that the new work be sufficiently transformative); Johnson, supra note 45
(arguing that the fair use doctrine “should remain a viable defense to claims that sampling
constitutes copyright infringement”).
49
17 U.S.C. § 107 (2016). The four factors to be analyzed by the courts are: (1) “the
purpose and character of the use, including whether such use is of a commercial nature or
is for nonprofit educational purposes”; (2) “the nature of the copyrighted work”; (3) “the
amount and substantiality of the portion used in relation to the copyrighted work as a
whole”; and (4) “the effect of the use upon the potential market for or value of the
copyrighted work.”
50
See, e.g., NIMMER & NIMMER supra note 10 at § 13.03 [A] [1]-[4]. Compare
Carter, supra note 10, at 681–84 (criticizing the Bridgeport holding and proposing the use
of the Fragmented Literal Similarity Test as the standard for sound recording infringement
cases), and Cromer, supra note 10, at 283 (arguing that the “Sixth Circuit’s blanket
disregard for substantial similarity or a de minimis test is not only improper but reckless”),
and Galvin, supra note 10, at 539 (criticizing the Bridgeport Holding and asserting that the
Sixth Circuit “should have affirmed the decision of the district court and dismissed the
plaintiffs infringement claim”), and Schietinger, supra note 10, at 210 (criticizing the
Bridgeport holding as “problematic and potentially harmful”), with Tracy L. Reilly,
Debunking the Top Three Myths of Digital Sampling: An Endorsement of the Bridgeport
Music Court's Attempt to Afford "Sound" Copyright Protection to Sound Recordings, 31
COLUM. J.L. & ARTS 355, 362 (2008) (arguing in favor of the Bridgeport decision and
stating that prior to Bridgeport, “neither sampling musicians nor sampled musicians were
48
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unauthorized sampling was substantial, and clearly recognizable to the
listener, there can be little doubt that, without going through the proper
legal channels, copyright infringement has occurred.51 However, cases
began to arise in courts where musicians had sampled very small portions of
songs, sometimes virtually unrecognizable, but were still being sued for
copyright infringement.52 In several of these sampling cases defendants
employed the de minimis defense to combat the allegations of infringement,
and in cases where a song sampled only a small portion of another song,
these defendants were successful.53 In contrast, there is little case law on the

protected sufficiently by these laws and music industry practices”), and VMG Salsoul,
LLC v. Ciccone, 824 F.3d 871, 889 (9th Cir. 2016) (Silverman, B., dissenting) (arguing
that Bridgeport’s arguments are “well-reasoned and persuasive,” noting Congress’ silence
after the decision and stating that “[o]nce the sound is fixed, it is tangible property
belonging to the copyright holder, and no one else has the right to take even a little of it
without permission”).
51
See NIMMER & NIMMER supra note 10 at § 13.03 [A]; Runtagh, supra note 5.
52
See, e.g., Newton v. Diamond, 388 F.3d 1189, 1192 (9th Cir. 2004) (defendant’s
alleged infringement based on a six-second, three-note flute segment of plaintiff’s musical
composition); Tuff 'N' Rumble Mgmt. v. Profile Records, Inc., 1997 U.S. Dist. LEXIS
4186 (S.D.N.Y. Apr. 2, 1997) (defendant’s alleged infringement based on sampling a
portion of plaintiff’s drum track from a prior sound recording); Jarvis v. A & M Records,
827 F. Supp. 282, 291 (D.N.J. 1993) (defendant’s alleged infringement based on a sample
of short vocal pieces and a keyboard riff of plaintiff’s prior sound recording); Grand
Upright Music, Ltd. v. Warner Bros. Records, 780 F. Supp. 182, 183 (S.D.N.Y. 1991)
(defendant’s alleged infringement based on three words taken from plaintiff's song and a
portion of music taken from the plaintiff’s original sound recording).
53
See, e.g., Newton, 388 F.3d at 1197–98 (granting summary judgment to defendant
because alleged copying was de minimis); Jean v. Bug Music, Inc., No. 00 Civ. 4022, 2002
U.S. Dist. LEXIS 3176 (S.D.N.Y. Feb. 25, 2002) (granting summary judgment to
defendants because even assuming plaintiff’s phrase was protected, alleged infringement
was de minimis); Tuff 'N' Rumble Mgmt., 1997 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 4186 (S.D.N.Y. Apr. 2,
1997) (granting summary judgment to defendants because defendant’s alleged
infringement was not substantially similar as a matter of law).

2017] SPLIT CHORDS: ADDRESSING THE FEDERAL CIRCUIT

147

defense of fair use in music sampling cases, thus, it is unclear how willing
courts would be to accept this defense in music sampling cases.54
In 2005, however, Bridgeport Music Inc. v. Dimension Films Inc.
appeared to create a sea change in the interpretation of copyright law in
regards to the sampling of sound recordings.55 In 2001, the music publishing
house Bridgeport Music Inc., joined by several other related entities, filed a
law suit the Middle District of Tennessee alleging nearly 500 counts of
copyright infringement against close to 800 defendants.56 The District Court
severed the original complaint into 476 separate actions, which were
whittled down to about a dozen over several years of proceedings and were
then consolidated into the Bridgeport case.57
At the heart of the Bridgeport claim was a two second, three-chord
guitar solo from the Funkadelic song “Get Off Your Ass and Jam.”58 The
soundtrack for defendant Dimension’s movie “I Got the Hook Up” included
the N.W.A.’s song “100 Miles and Runnin,’” which sampled and looped the
two second guitar piece from “Get Off Your Ass and Jam” several times.59
The defendant did not deny that the piece of music was sampled,60 but

54

See, e.g., Landau, supra note 45, at 17–18.
Bridgeport Music, Inc. v. Dimension Films, 410 F.3d 792, 804–05 (6th Cir. 2005).
56
Bridgeport Music, Inc. v. Dimension Films, 230 F. Supp. 2d 830, 832 (M.D.
Tenn. 2002); Bridgeport, 410 F.3d at 795.
57
Bridgeport, 410 F.3d at 795.
58
Id. at 796.
59
Id.
60
Id.
55
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moved for summary judgment.61 The defendant argued the sample was
legally insubstantial or de minimis and therefore did not amount to
actionable copying, and in the alternative, even if the sampling was not de
minimis, it was protected under the copyright doctrine of fair use.62
The District Court dismissed the plaintiff’s case on summary
judgement, holding the sample at issue used by the defendant was de
minimis and therefore not actionable.63 The District Court used two different
tests for substantial similarity and found that after listening to the sample
and both songs, no reasonable juror “would recognize the source of the
sample without being told of its source,” and therefore the infringement was
de minimis.64
On appeal, the Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit issued an
opinion65 that reversed the lower court, and in an industry-altering decision
held that any sampling of a recorded piece of music, regardless of how short

61

Id. at 796–97.
Bridgeport Music, Inc. v. Dimension Films, 230 F. Supp. 2d 830, 838–40 (M.D.
Tenn. 2002); Bridgeport, 410 F.3d at 805.
63
Bridgeport, 230 F. Supp. 2d at 842–43.
64
Id. (The District Court did a fairly detailed substantial similarity analysis, using
both a quantitative/qualitative test as well as the “fragmented literal similarity” test on the
sample in question.)
65
Bridgeport, 410 F.3d at 795. (The Court issued an initial opinion on the
consolidated cases on September 7, 2004. Bridgeport Music, Inc. v. Dimension Films, 383
F.3d 390 (6th Cir. 2004). In December 2004, the court denied defendant’s the petition for
rehearing en banc, but a panel rehearing was granted for the issues discussed in Part II of
the opinion, which are the issues discussed in this Note. Bridgeport Music, Inc. v.
Dimension Films, 401 F.3d 647 (6th Cir. 2004); see infra Part II. The court noted that
“[a]fter additional briefing and argument on rehearing, we adhere to our conclusions and
amend the opinion to further clarify our reasoning.” Bridgeport, 410 F.3d at 795.
62
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or unrecognizable it may be, could be actionable for copyright
infringement.66 Under the Bridgeport court’s interpretation of the Copyright
Act of 1976, the copyright owner of a sound recording had the exclusive
right to duplicate and reuse the work,67 and thus any sampling and reuse
constituted infringement.68 The Court also declined to address the
defendant’s alternative fair use argument.69 The ruling appeared to
effectively do away with the de minimis defense for copyright cases
involving sampling,70 with the Court instructing musicians flatly to “[g]et a
license or do not sample.”71
The Bridgeport case, however, was not well received in the United
States by critics and scholars.72 Nevertheless, even with the Bridgeport

66

Id. at 801–02.
Id. at 801. The court noted, “[i]n other words, a sound recording owner has the
exclusive right to ‘sample’ his own recording.” Id.
68
Id.
69
Id. at 805. The Court stated that because the lower court ruled the infringement
was de minimis and thus there was no infringement, it was not necessary to consider the
affirmative defense of fair use. Bridgeport, 410 F.3d at 805.
70
See NIMMER & NIMMER supra note 10 at § 13.03 [A][2][b]; Carter, supra note 10,
at 688; Schietinger, supra note 10, at 227–30.
71
Bridgeport, 410 F.3d at 801.
72
See NIMMER & NIMMER supra note 10 at § 13.03 [A][2][b]; Carter, supra note 10,
at 681–84 (criticizing the Bridgeport holding and proposing the use of the Fragmented
Literal Similarity Test as the standard for sound recording infringement cases); Cromer,
supra note 10, at 283 (arguing that the “Sixth Circuit’s blanket disregard for substantial
similarity or a de minimis test is not only improper but reckless”); Galvin, supra note 10, at
539 (criticizing the Bridgeport Holding and asserting that the Sixth Circuit “should have
affirmed the decision of the district court and dismissed the plaintiffs infringement claim”);
Schietinger, supra note 10, at 210 (criticizing the Bridgeport holding as “problematic and
potentially harmful”). Moreover, even some courts, including District Courts in California,
Florida, and Louisiana, declined to follow and instead used the traditional substantial
similarity tests, including analyzing de minimis defenses. Steward v. West, No. 13-02449,
2014 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 186012, *25 n.8 (C.D. Cal. Aug. 14, 2014) (noting that Bridgeport
“has been criticized by courts and commentators alike” and declining to follow its
67
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court’s opinion inviting Congress to address its landmark ruling,73 the
legislature has not yet taken any action and the Supreme Court has also not
addressed the opinion in the more than ten years since the case was
decided.74 The Bridgeport holding remains good law in the Sixth Circuit—
which notably includes the “Music City” of Nashville—and had not been
directly challenged, until now.75
The Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals decided to confront Bridgeport
head-on in VMG Salsoul v. Ciccone.76 In Ciccone, the artist Madonna was
sued for the use of a “horn hit”77 allegedly sampled from an earlier disco

holding); Batiste v. Najm, 28 F. Supp. 3d 595, 625 n.52 (E.D. La. 2014) (noting
Bridgeport’s holding and declining to follow); Saregama India Ltd. v. Mosley, 687 F.
Supp. 2d 1325, 1338–1341 (S.D. Fla. 2009) (explicitly declining to follow Bridgeport’s
holding, finding that Bridgeport’s statutory interpretation was flawed and that the
Bridgeport court’s “policy prescriptions, however accurate they may be, do not present
grounds for this Court to follow its direction”); EMI Records Ltd. v. Premise Media Corp.
L.P., 2008 N.Y. Misc. LEXIS 7485 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. Aug. 8, 2008) (explicitly declining to
follow the statutory interpretation “relied upon by the court in Bridgeport Music to declare
the bright line rule that a de minimis exception is not available”). Additionally, after the
Bridgeport decision, David Nimmer dedicated a short section of his preeminent treatise
Nimmer on Copyright to the decision, picking the Bridgeport court’s argument apart.
NIMMER & NIMMER supra note 10 at § 13.03 [A][2][b].
73
Bridgeport, 410 F.3d at 805 (noting that the Court took a “literal reading”
approach to their interpretation of the federal statute and that “[i]f this is not what Congress
intended or is not what they would intend now, it is easy enough for the record industry, as
they have done in the past, to go back to Congress for a clarification or change in the law”).
74
VMG Salsoul, LLC v. Ciccone, 824 F.3d 871, 889 (9th Cir. 2016) (Silverman, B.,
dissenting) (noting Congress’ inaction in the more than ten years since the Bridgeport
decision).
75
See VMG Salsoul, 824 F.3d at 886; 84 USLW 1826, Issue No. 46, June 9, 2016.
76
VMG Salsoul, 824 F.3d at 874.
77
VMG Salsoul, 824 F.3d at 875. (The “horn hit” discussed in the case was
alternately identified by the courts as a “horn stab,” or “horn part,” but was described as “a
single chord that is played eleven times in Defendants’ work, Vogue.”); VMG Salsoul,
LLC v. Ciccone, No. CV 12-05967, 2013 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 184127 (C.D. Cal. Nov. 18,
2013).
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track and reused in her wildly successful song “Vogue.”78 The plaintiff
alleged that the producer of “Vogue” sampled a .23 second horn part from
the song “Love Break” and inserted it into “Vogue.”79
The District Court found the sampled portion lacked sufficient
originality to be eligible for copyright protection, and that even if it was
copyrightable, the sampling was de minimis.80 On appeal, the Ninth Circuit
explicitly declined to follow Bridgeport and affirmed, holding that a
substantial similarity analysis must be done and that the traditional de
minimis defense is available in infringement cases involving samples of
copyrighted sound recordings, just like in other copyright infringement
cases.81 In doing so, the Ninth Circuit created a circuit split which now
subjects copyright infringement actions to different standards of legal
analysis.82
II. ANALYSIS
This section will discuss and analyze the arguments presented both
by the Bridgeport and VMG Salsoul opinions by weighing the reasoning of
78

VMG Salsoul, 824 F.3d at 875.
Id. at 875–77. (The producer in question, Shep Pettibone, produced both the songs
“Love Break” and “Vogue” and plaintiff offered the testimony of Pettibone’s assistant who
claimed that he witnessed Pettibone direct an engineer to insert the sample from “Love
Break” into “Vogue.” The defendant denied this allegation, however, and disputed both the
fact that there was actual copying and, in the alternative, even if the portion used was
copied from “Love Break” it was de minimis.)
80
Id. at 876.
81
Id. at 880–88; 84 USLW 1826, Issue No. 46, June 9, 2016.
82
See 84 USLW 1826, Issue No. 46, June 9, 2016; Bill Donahue, 9th Circ. Throws
Down The Gauntlet On Music Sampling, LAW360, http://www.law360.com/articles/803236
(last visited Oct. 8, 2016).
79
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those two opinions against the background of established copyright law and
congressional intent.
A. The Bridgeport Argument: “Get A License Or Do Not Sample”
The controversial portion of the Bridgeport Court’s decision focused
narrowly on the issue of whether an admitted sampling83 of a sound
recording required the use of a substantial similarity analysis by the courts
to determine whether or not the use constituted infringement.84 The heart of
the final85 Bridgeport decision is the Court’s statutory interpretation of two
sections of the federal government’s Copyright Act of 1976: § 106 and
§ 114.86

83

Bridgeport Music, Inc. v. Dimension Films, 410 F.3d 792, 796 (6th Cir. 2005).
(The Court points out that, “[b]ecause defendant does not deny it, we assume that the sound
track of Hook Up used portions of ‘100 Miles’ that included the allegedly infringing
sample from ‘Get Off.’”)
84
Id. at 798.
85
See supra note 65.
86
Bridgeport, 410 F.3d at 799–802. (Section 106, entitled “Exclusive rights in
copyrighted works” is the portion of the Copyright Act which explains the types of
exclusive rights the owner of a copyright is entitled to under the Act, which are:
(1) to reproduce the copyrighted work in copies or phonorecords; (2) to
prepare derivative works based upon the copyrighted work; (3) to
distribute copies or phonorecords of the copyrighted work to the public
by sale or other transfer of ownership, or by rental, lease, or lending; (4)
in the case of literary, musical, dramatic, and choreographic works,
pantomimes, and motion pictures and other audiovisual works, to
perform the copyrighted work publicly; (5) in the case of literary,
musical, dramatic, and choreographic works, pantomimes, and pictorial,
graphic, or sculptural works, including the individual images of a motion
picture or other audiovisual work, to display the copyrighted work
publicly; and (6) in the case of sound recordings, to perform the
copyrighted work publicly by means of a digital audio transmission.
17 U.S.C. § 106 (2016).
Section 114, in contrast, is entitled “Scope of exclusive rights in sound recordings” and sets
forth the limitations on a copyright owner’s exclusive rights. 17 U.S.C. § 114 (2016).
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Statutory Interpretation
The Bridgeport Court focused much of their analysis on §114 of the

Copyright Act of 1976, particularly the language of §114(b) and how it
relates to § 106.87 The Bridgeport Court’s key argument centered on the fact
that the Copyright Act of 1976 added the word “entirely” into the preceding
clause from similar language found in the earlier Sound Recording Act of
1971.88 The Court argued that this change in the statutory text demonstrated
Congress’ intent that the owner of a sound recording copyright “has the
exclusive right to ‘sample’ his own recording.”89
The Court argued that because the word “entirely” had been added
to the predecessor statute, it demonstrated a change in Congress’ intent: if
the new piece of music is entirely free from copying (sampling) there is no
copyright protection, therefore if the new piece of music has any copying
(sampling) then copyright protection automatically extends to it, regardless
of how much was copied.90 The Bridgeport Court noted that they had

87

Bridgeport, 410 F.3d at 799–800; see also 17 U.S.C. § 114 (2016); NIMMER &
NIMMER supra note 10 at § 13.03 [A][2][b].
88
Bridgeport, 410 F.3d at 800.
89
Id. at 801.
90
Id. (The Court noted that they employed a “literal reading approach” to their
statutory interpretation. Id. at 805. The Bridgeport Court cites two main sources for its
statutory interpretation rationale: the copyright treatise Kohn on Music Licensing, an
extensive portion of which was cited by the court in a footnote to argue that they had not
simply pulled their statutory interpretation “out of thin air,” as well as a law review article
by Susan J. Latham, at the time an LL.M. student in Intellectual Property at the Benjamin
N. Cardozo School of Law. Id. at 803, n.18; Susan Latham, Newton v. Diamond:
Measuring the Legitimacy of Unauthorized Compositional Sampling - A Clue Illuminated
and Obscured, 26 HASTINGS COMM. & ENT. L.J. 119, 124–27 (2003). The quoted section of
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consulted the legislative history of the act, which appears to conflict with
their interpretation,91 but the Court disregarded it by arguing that “the
legislative history is of little help because digital sampling wasn’t being
done in 1971.”92 Inextricably tied to the Bridgeport Court’s rationale for
their statutory interpretation is their argument that sound recordings are
distinguishable from other types of copyright infringement and thus require

Al and Bob Kohn’s work states that “[b]y using the words ‘entirely of an independent
fixation’ in referring to sound recordings which may imitate or simulate the sounds of
another, Congress may have intended that a recording containing any sounds of another
recording would constitute infringement.” Bridgeport, 410 F.3d at 803 n.18. The cited
portion of Latham’s Law Review Note, discussing §114(b) of the copyright act reads:
The import of this language is that it does not matter how much a digital
sampler alters the actual sounds or whether the ordinary lay observer can
or cannot recognize the song or the artist's performance of it. Since the
exclusive right encompasses rearranging, remixing, or otherwise altering
the actual sounds, the statute by its own terms precludes the use of a
substantial similarity test. Thus, the defenses available to a defendant are
significantly limited.
Latham, supra at 125.
91
See VMG Salsoul, LLC v. Ciccone, 824 F.3d 871, 883–84 (9th Cir. 2016) (finding
that the legislative history of the Copyright Act of 1976 for § 114 indicates that Congress
intended that liability for infringement attach “whenever all or any substantial portion” of
the sound recording is reproduced and used without authorization); see also NIMMER &
NIMMER supra note 10 at § 13.03 [A][2][b] (arguing that the legislative history of § 114
“debunks the [Bridgeport] court’s imputation that Congress, when adopting Section 114,
intended to dispense with traditional notions of substantial similarity”). For context, the full
passage of the legislative history for § 114 reads:
Subsection (b) of section 114 makes clear that statutory protection for
sound recordings extends only to the particular sounds of which the
recording consists, and would not prevent a separate recording of another
performance in which those sounds are imitated. Thus, infringement
takes place whenever all or any substantial portion of the actual sounds
that go to make up a copyrighted sound recording are reproduced in
phonorecords by repressing, transcribing, recapturing off the air, or any
other method, or by reproducing them in the soundtrack or audio portion
of a motion picture or other audiovisual work. Mere imitation of a
recorded performance would not constitute a copyright infringement
even where one performer deliberately sets out to simulate another's
performance as exactly as possible.
H.R. REP. NO. 94-1476, at 5721 (1976).
92
Bridgeport, 410 F.3d at 805.
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different treatment under the Copyright Act.93 Based on the Court’s
interpretation of the Copyright Act, Bridgeport created a bright line rule,
holding that the sampling and subsequent re-use of a sound recording in
another medium, no matter what size, constituted a per se infringement.94
The court thus held the substantial similarity test, and accordingly de
minimis, did not apply in the context of music sampling.95
“Sweat of the Brow” and Other Policy Rationales

2.

In addition to their statutory interpretation, the Bridgeport Court
also introduced several policy arguments as to why they believed their new
bright line rule was both desirable and proper.96 One of the Court’s
rationales was what amounts to a “sweat of the brow” argument—the artist
who is being sampled should not have the fruit of his labor taken without
compensation.97 The Court said that fragments of songs taken in sampling
cases are valuable,98 and argued that artists would not sample otherwise,
because it either saves the artist time, adds something to the new recording,

93

Id. at 802. The court explained: “[f]or the sound recording copyright holder, it is
not the ‘song’ but the sounds that are fixed in the medium of his choice. When those
sounds are sampled they are taken directly from that fixed medium. It is a physical taking
rather than an intellectual one.” Id.
94
Id. at 801.
95
Id. at 801–02.
96
Id. at 802–05.
97
See discussion infra Part II. B. 2.
98
Bridgeport, 410 F.3d at 802. The Court argued that even small samples are
valuable to the sampling artist either because it saved the artist the time and money of
having to recreate that piece of music for the new work, or because the sampled piece of
music has a particular “sound” that is recognizable and thus valuable to the new recording.
Id.
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or both.99 The Court also said their holding would create “ease of
enforcement,” telling artists flatly: “Get a license or do not sample.”100 The
Court argued that without this bright line rule, fact finders would be subject
to “mental, musicological, and technological gymnastics” in trying to apply
a de minimis or substantial similarity analysis.101
B.

The Ninth Circuit’s Response To Bridgeport

In VMG Salsoul, the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals upheld the
District Court’s summary judgement ruling for the defendant because even
if proved, the alleged infringement was de minimis.102 The Ninth Circuit
said it declined to follow Bridgeport because it disagreed with Bridgeport’s
statutory interpretation of the Copyright Act and that, regardless of the
policy arguments advanced by the Bridgeport Court, they were bound to
follow Congress’ intent.103
Addressing Bridgeport’s Statutory Interpretation

1.

The VMG Salsoul Court notes as a basic premise that 17 U.S.C.
§ 114(b), which Bridgeport read to expand the sound recording copyright

99

Id.
Id. at 801. The Court points out that artists are free to imitate those portions of
songs they would like to replicate, but copying and reusing a sample is forbidden under
their interpretation of the Copyright Act. Id. at 802. In another policy argument, the court
also contends that the music industry will be able to create workable guidelines for sample
licensing, that the majority of musicians apparently already go through this sample
licensing process and that for defendants it would “appear to be cheaper to license than to
litigate.” Id. at 802–04.
101
Id. at 802.
102
VMG Salsoul, LLC v. Ciccone, 824 F.3d 871, 874 (9th Cir. 2016).
103
See VMG Salsoul, 824 F.3d at 884–87.
100
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holder’s rights, actually seeks to define the limits of copyright protection,
and therefore the Bridgeport Court’s use of that statute to expand a
copyright holder’s power was questionable.104 The Court points out that the
legislative history of the Act supports this proposition because it shows that
§ 106 of the Copyright Act, which explains the nature of a copyright
holder’s exclusive rights, is subject to the limitations of §§ 107—118,
including § 114, and “‘must be read in conjunction with those
provisions.’”105
The Ninth Circuit then directly confronted the key behind
Bridgeport’s reasoning: the inference the Bridgeport Court read into their
statutory interpretation of §114(b).106 The VMG Court held that the

104

Id. at 883. The Ninth Circuit explains that “[w]e ordinarily would hesitate to read
an implicit expansion of rights into Congress’ statement of an express limitation on rights.”
Id.
105
Id. The Court also points out that 17 U.S.C. § 102, which generally defines the
areas protected by copyright law and 17 U.S.C. § 106, which explains the exclusive rights
the owner of a copyright retains, treats sound recordings no differently than any other type
of protected work. Id. at 881–83.
106
Id. at 883–85. As previously noted, one of the basic premises Bridgeport relies on
is that because Congress added the word “entirely” into the wording of §114(b), it
demonstrated Congress’ intent that the owners of a copyright of a sound recording have an
exclusive right to the use and recreation of their own work. See discussion supra Part II. A.
Throughout much of the opinion relating to Bridgeport, the Ninth Circuit impliedly follows
parts of the critique by Professor David Nimmer of the Bridgeport decision in Nimmer on
Copyright. Compare NIMMER & NIMMER supra note 10 at § 13.03 [A][2][b] with VMG
Salsoul, 824 F.3d at 880–88. In the section addressing the Bridgeport decision, Nimmer
succinctly summarizes the Bridgeport court’s logical syllogism regarding §114(b): “That
sentence immunizes the maker of a sound-alike recording; if no sounds are recaptured, the
newcomer is categorically exempt from liability to the owner of the sound recording. From
that proposition, the panel summarily reasons that if some sounds are recaptured, the
newcomer’s liability is complete.” NIMMER & NIMMER supra note 10 at § 13.03 [A][2][b].
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reasoning in Bridgeport is based on a “logical fallacy.”107 The Court’s
argument was: based on the premise that adding the word “entirely” into the
statutory text of § 114(b) means that Congress intended no liability should
attach when none of a sound recording was used in another piece of music,
it does not logically follow for the Bridgeport Court to infer that liability
should then automatically attach when any of the sound recording is used in
another piece of music.108
The Court pointed out that, “[a] statement that rights do not extend
to a particular circumstance does not automatically mean that the rights
extend to all other circumstances,”109 and demonstrated this by giving an
example following the logic behind the Bridgeport Court’s statutory
interpretation.110 The Ninth Circuit supported their challenge to Bridgeport’s
statutory interpretation with the legislative history of § 114 that Bridgeport

107

VMG Salsoul, 824 F.3d at 884. This language again comes from Nimmer. NIMMER
& NIMMER supra note 10 at § 13.03 [A][2][b].
108
VMG Salsoul, 824 F.3d at 884–85.
109
Id. at 884.
110
Id. at 885. The example used by the Ninth Circuit in VMG Salsoul does an
excellent job of succinctly demonstrating the logical flaw in Bridgeport’s reasoning:
For example, take as a given the proposition that “if it has rained, then
the grass is not dry.” It does not necessarily follow that “if it has not
rained, then the grass is dry.” Someone may have watered the lawn, for
instance. We cannot infer the second if-then statement from the first. The
first if-then statement does not tell us anything about the condition of the
grass if it has not rained. Accordingly, even though it is true that, “if the
recording consists entirely of independent sounds, then the copyright
does not extend to it,” that statement does not necessarily mean that “if
the recording does not consist entirely of independent sounds, then the
copyright does extend to it.”
Id.
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dismissed,111 which conflicts with the Bridgeport Court’s reading of the
Copyright Act.112
“Sweat of the Brow” and Policy Arguments

2.

The VMG Salsoul Court also took exception to two other arguments
advanced by Bridgeport. First, the argument that even small portions of
music recordings sampled are valuable and thus the original artist’s efforts
should be protected,113 essentially making a “sweat of the brow”
argument,114 and second, that because the sounds sampled are “fixed in the
medium,” (they are already recorded onto a tape, or saved electronically)
and the sample directly replicates that sound, “[i]t is a physical taking rather
than an intellectual one.”115

111

Bridgeport Music, Inc. v. Dimension Films, 410 F.3d 792, 805 (6th Cir. 2005). In
that legislative history, Congress notes that “infringement takes place whenever all or any
substantial portion of the actual sounds that go to make up a copyrighted sound recording
are reproduced.” H.R. REP. NO. 94-1476, at 5721 (1976). This is at odds with the
Bridgeport Court’s interpretation of the Copyright Act. VMG Salsoul, 824 F.3d at 883.
112
Id.
113
Bridgeport Music, Inc. v. Dimension Films, 410 F.3d 792, 802 (6th Cir. 2005).
The court notes that “even when a small part of a sound recording is sampled, the part
taken is something of value . . . [w]hen those sounds are sampled they are taken directly
from that fixed medium. It is a physical taking rather than an intellectual one.” Id.
114
See Feist Publ'ns, Inc. v. Rural Tel. Serv. Co., 499 U.S. 340, 349 (1991)
(explaining that some courts had misconstrued the Copyright Act and used the “sweat of
the brow” argument to uphold copyright infringement cases dealing with compilations of
facts with no original expression, noting, “these courts developed a new theory to justify
the protection of factual compilations. Known alternatively as "sweat of the brow" or
‘industrious collection,’ the underlying notion was that copyright was a reward for the hard
work that went into compiling facts.”).
115
Bridgeport, 410 F.3d at 802.
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The Ninth Circuit dismissed Bridgeport’s “sweat of the brow”
argument relying on Feist Publ’ns, Inc. v. Rural Tel. Serv. Co.116 The Ninth
Circuit argued that in Feist, the Supreme Court held “unequivocally that the
Copyright Act protects only the expressive aspects of a copyrighted work
and not the ‘fruit of the [author’s] labor.’”117 Addressing the second
argument, the Ninth Circuit held that a “physical taking,” as opposed to an
intellectual one, can happen across the copyright law spectrum, and gave
the example of copying a photograph118 to note that the de minimis principle
applies in all of those comparable situations.119 The Court stated, “we can
think of no principled reason to differentiate one kind of ‘physical taking’
from another.”120

116

See Feist, 499 U.S. at 349 (holding that the “sweat of the brow” doctrine used
extensively by lower courts was improper because it defied basic copyright principles).
117
VMG Salsoul, 824 F.3d at 885. See also Feist Publ'ns, Inc. v. Rural Tel. Serv. Co.,
499 U.S. 340, 349 (1991). The Supreme Court, talking about striking down the “sweat of
the brow” argument courts had used for years to uphold copyright infringement actions,
said:
It may seem unfair that much of the fruit of the compiler's labor may be
used by others without compensation. As Justice Brennan has correctly
observed, however, this is not “some unforeseen byproduct of a statutory
scheme.” It is, rather, “the essence of copyright,” and a constitutional
requirement. The primary objective of copyright is not to reward the
labor of authors, but “to promote the Progress of Science and useful
Arts.”
Id. (citations omitted).
118
VMG Salsoul, 824 F.3d at 885. The Court’s argument is that in the same way a
music sample makes an “exact” replica of the original sound recording, someone reprinting
or photocopying a photograph is an “exact” replica of the original photograph, thus the
distinction is arbitrary. Id.
119
Id.
120
Id.
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Lastly, the Ninth Circuit addressed Bridgeport’s policy reasoning
for establishing the bright line rule of “get a license or do not sample”121 by
arguing that regardless of the policy arguments advanced by a judge, the
Federal Circuit Courts are tasked with interpreting and following the desire
of the legislature through the statutes and laws they enact.122
C.

Addressing Bridgeport, VMG Salsoul, And The Resulting Circuit Split
The Ninth Circuit’s opinion in VMG Salsoul created a Federal

circuit split which now subjects litigants to different rules of law depending
on where they file their lawsuit.123 Unless and until the Supreme Court or
Congress decides to address the issue, other courts tasked with deciding
similar lawsuits will be faced with an undecided area of law.124 In order to
address this issue, a weighing of the arguments behind Bridgeport and VMG
Salsoul is helpful.

121

Bridgeport Music, Inc. v. Dimension Films, 410 F.3d 792, 801 (6th Cir. 2005).
VMG Salsoul, 824 F.3d at 887. The Ninth Circuit points out that Bridgeport’s
policy arguments “are for a legislature, not a court. They speak to what Congress could
decide; they do not inform what Congress actually decided.” Id. The Ninth Circuit also
disregarded the argument made by Judge Silverman in the opinion’s dissent that because
Congress has not intervened, Bridgeport has “correctly divined congressional intent,”
adding:
[t]he Supreme Court has held that congressional inaction in the face of a
judicial statutory interpretation, even with respect to the Supreme Court's
own decisions affecting the entire nation, carries almost no
weight . . . . Here, Congress’ inaction with respect to a decision by one
circuit court has even less import, especially considering that many other
courts have declined to apply Bridgeport's rule.
Id.
123
84 U.S.L.W. 1826 (2016).
124
Id.
122
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Prior to Bridgeport, there was not a large body of copyright case law
which dealt specifically with music sampling, but courts applied a
substantial similarity and de minimis analysis to copyright cases, including
sampling cases, almost universally.125 In fact, courts have recognized the
concept of substantial similarity as being a basic tenant of copyright
protection dating back to 1841 in the case of Folsom v. Marsh.126 In VMG
Salsoul, the Ninth Circuit decided to continue applying those long-standing
principles of substantial similarity and de minimis to music sampling cases

125

VMG Salsoul, 824 F.3d at 881 (finding that “courts consistently have applied the
rule in all cases alleging copyright infringement”). This included the Sixth Circuit as well,
prior to the Circuit Court of Appeals decision in Bridgeport. Bridgeport Music, Inc. v.
Dimension Films, 230 F. Supp. 2d 830, 839–40 (M.D. Tenn. 2002). In fact, the lower
District Court in Bridgeport explicitly said in their initial ruling that the Circuit recognized
the concept as applying to copyright infringement cases, and cited to a case from 1943
which held so, writing:
The Sixth Circuit has recognized that the principle of de minimis non
curat lex (“the law cares not for trifles”) can be applied as a defense to
copyright infringement if it can be shown that a substantial amount of the
copyrighted work was not taken.
Id. See also Galvin, supra note 10 at 532–33; Carter supra note 10 at 677; Schietinger
supra note 10 at 218–19. But see Grand Upright Music, Ltd. v. Warner Bros. Records, 780
F. Supp. 182, 183–85 (S.D.N.Y. 1991) (finding that defendants intentionally violated
plaintiff’s copyrights by using three words from plaintiff's song and sampling a portion of
the plaintiff’s master recording without permission on defendant’s album and finding for
the plaintiff without doing any kind of substantial similarity analysis). The court in Grand
Upright Music started out the opinion ominously quoting “Thou shall not steal,” the
Seventh Commandment from Exodus in the Bible. Id. at 183. The court was so vexed that
the defendant had intentionally appropriated the material that they referred the case to the
United States Attorney to look into criminal charges. Id. at 185. Grand Upright Music,
however was one of the earliest reported sampling cases and is the minority of
infringement cases which haven’t applied some type of substantial similarity analysis. See
Galvin supra note 10 at 532–33; Carter supra note 10 at 677; Schietinger supra note 10 at
218–19.
126
See supra note 35 and accompanying text.
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and declined to follow Bridgeport, which rejected those principles in the
context of music sampling.127
Thus, in comparing the two holdings the essential question becomes
whether Bridgeport’s bright line rule passes muster and should overturn the
decades-old copyright case law principles to which VMG Salsoul adheres. It
follows that the Bridgeport opinion must demonstrate a compelling
argument as to why courts should do so. The Sixth Circuit attempted to do
this by arguing: (1) Congress specifically intended for sound recordings to
be protected to a greater extent than all other copyrightable works in the
Copyright Act; and (2) music sampling is distinguishable in a meaningful
way from all other types of copyright infringement cases.
1.

Statutory Interpretation of the Copyright Act
Comparing the statutory interpretation of the Copyright Act of 1976

in the context of music sampling by both the Bridgeport and VMG Salsoul
Courts, the stronger argument is advanced by the Ninth Circuit. The Court’s
position in VMG Salsoul is that Congress did not intend for § 114 of the
Copyright Act to treat sound recordings any differently, as the Bridgeport
court holds, and that based on the legislative history, Congress intended that

127

Bridgeport Music, Inc. v. Dimension Films, 410 F.3d 792, 803 (6th Cir. 2005)
(finding the de minimis defense did not apply to sound recordings under federal copyright
law and any unauthorized copying of sampled music, no matter how small or insignificant,
could constitute copyright infringement).
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a substantial similarity and de minimis analysis should be conducted for
music sampling cases.128
First, looking at the Bridgeport Court’s logic reasoning, the Ninth
Circuit is correct: it does not follow that because Congress intended for no
liability for infringement to attach when none of a sound recording was
used in another piece of music that liability should automatically attach
when any of the sound recording is used in another piece of music. As
pointed out by the Ninth Circuit and David Nimmer in Nimmer on
Copyright, there is an unsupported inferential leap made in that reasoning.129
In terms of formal logic, the syllogism proposed by the Sixth Circuit
in Bridgeport is called “the fallacy of affirming the consequent.”130 The

128

See VMG Salsoul, 824 F.3d at 886.
See discussion supra Part II. 2. A; see also VMG Salsoul, 824 F.3d at 884–85;
NIMMER & NIMMER supra note 10 at § 13.03 [A][2][b]; Galvin, supra note 10, at 537–38;
Schietinger, supra note 10, at 239–44. As Professor Nimmer points out in discussing the
flaws in Bridgeport’s statutory interpretation of § 114(b):
That sentence immunizes the maker of a sound-alike recording; if no
sounds are recaptured, the newcomer is categorically exempt from
liability to the owner of the sound recording. From that proposition, the
panel summarily reasons that if some sounds are recaptured, the
newcomer’s liability is complete. But it is submitted that that conclusion
rests on a logical fallacy. By validating entire sound-alike recordings, the
quoted sentence contains no implication that partial sound duplications
are to be treated any differently from what is required by the traditional
standards of copyright law—which, for decades prior to adoption of the
1976 Act and unceasingly in the decades since, has included the
requirement of substantial similarity.
NIMMER & NIMMER supra note 10 at § 13.03 [A][2][b].
130
Stephen M. Rice, Conspicuous Logic: Using the Logical Fallacy of Affirming the
Consequent as a Litigation Tool, 14 BARRY L. REV., 1, 10–12 (2010). The author explains
with an example how this type of logical fallacy works:
The Fallacy of Affirming the Consequent takes a similar, but
logically different, form from that of a well-formed hypothetical
syllogism. For example: 1. If assent to enter into a contract is made
129
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basic tenant of this logical flaw is that when there is a conditional “if-then”
statement (i.e. If A then necessarily B), it is a fallacy to infer the inverse of
the conditional based solely on the conditional (i.e. If B then necessarily A),
because the initial statement only provides that a limited premise is true, it
does not provide any information about the inverse of that condition.131
Thus, given the premise of the statement in § 114(b):132 If a sound recording
is a complete copy of another sound recording, then exclusive rights do not
extend to it, it cannot be properly deduced: If exclusive rights do extend to
the sound recording, then the sound recording is not copied at all (i.e. it is
free from copying).
One cannot properly take the “if-then” conditional statement in
§114(b), and assume the inverse is necessarily true.133 To do so would be

because of an improper threat that leaves the victim no reasonable
alternative, then the contract is voidable by the victim.
2. The contract is voidable by the victim. 3. Therefore, the assent to
enter into the contract was made because of an improper threat.
Understanding the nature of this logically invalid argument and why it is
logically invalid (and legally incorrect) requires an understanding of the
rules governing validity of hypothetical syllogisms. A hypothetical
syllogism must meet two basic logical rules in order to have a
deductively valid form. If the form of the syllogism is invalid, then the
syllogism cannot be relied upon to ensure the truth of the conclusion.
Where a syllogism violates one of these rules of logical form, the
syllogism is invalid, and the argument is said to be fallacious.
Id.
131

Id.
See discussion supra Part II A. 1.
133
Id. This concept is clearly demonstrated by the Ninth Circuit’s example in VMG
Salsoul. VMG Salsoul, LLC v. Ciccone, 824 F.3d 871, 885 (9th Cir. 2016). The court’s
example shows the logical reasoning problem with Bridgeport’s interpretation:
For example, take as a given the proposition that “if it has rained,
then the grass is not dry.” It does not necessarily follow that “if it has not
rained, then the grass is dry.” Someone may have watered the lawn, for
132
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affirming the consequent. That is not to say that is impossible for the
consequent (Bridgeport’s premise) to be true, only that one cannot simply
infer it from the conditional statement in § 114 alone. In the case of the
premise in § 114, to prove the consequent is true would require some type
of outside support to show that Congress actually intended that sound
recordings are afforded absolute protection against copying and re-use, as
opposed to all other mediums which are subject to a substantial similarity
analysis.134
Additional support to bolster the Bridgeport Court’s interpretation
of Congressional intent would normally be found in the legislative history
or through other anecdotal evidence of Congressional intent, but the
legislative history for the Copyright Act that Bridgeport dismissed actually
demonstrates the opposite of what Bridgeport concludes.135 As the Ninth
Circuit points out, Congress notes in the legislative history of § 114 of the
Copyright Act that, “infringement takes place whenever all or any
substantial portion of the actual sounds that go to make up a copyrighted
sound recording are reproduced.”136

instance. We cannot infer the second if-then statement from the first. The
first if-then statement does not tell us anything about the condition of the
grass if it has not rained.
Id.
134

See discussion supra Part II. 2. A; see also VMG Salsoul, 824 F.3d at 884–85;
NIMMER & NIMMER supra note 10 at § 13.03 [A][2][b].
135
See discussion supra Part II. 2. A.
136
H.R. REP. NO. 94-1476, at 5721 (1976) (emphasis added).
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The only reasonable reading of this statement is that Congress
intended for infringement liability to attach when an alleged infringer
copies and reuses “all or any substantial portion” of the work without
authorization. Therefore, this would logically require courts to do some
form of substantial similarity analysis when dealing with copyright
infringement cases to determine when a “substantial portion” of the work
has been copied and reused.137 Furthermore, because courts have applied de
minimis to copyright infringement cases under the substantial similarity
test,138 it would also logically require courts to determine whether the
alleged infringement is de minimis. In addition, while the language in the
Copyright Act did change from the earlier Sound Recording Act of 1971,
the legislative history which Bridgeport dismissed as being irrelevant was
written at the same time that Congress changed the statutory language,
which further suggests that Congress did intend that sound recordings be
subject to a substantial similarity analysis.139 Thus, as the Ninth Circuit
concluded in VMG Salsoul, the legislative history tends to rebut the
Bridgeport Court’s inference that § 114 of the Copyright Act treats sound

137

See discussion supra Part I. This would be faithful to the body of copyright law
dating back to the 1800’s which requires such analysis. Id.
138
See discussion supra Part I.
139
H.R. REP. NO. 94-1476 (1976).
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recordings differently and therefore they are not subject to substantial
similarity and de minimis tests, as Bridgeport suggests.140
In addition to the legislative history, another issue with Bridgeport’s
statutory interpretation of § 114 is that it lacks solid support from secondary
sources. Although the Court states that they did not pull their “interpretation
out of thin air,”141 the material they cite for support is unconvincing. First,
the court cites to a section of the treatise Kohn on Music Licensing, which
proposes the same interpretation of § 114 that the Bridgeport Court
reached.142 The problem is not the source itself, but what the source says.
The quoted section of Kohn is not definitive in its reasoning, as it states,
“Congress may have intended that a recording containing any sounds of
another recording would constitute infringement.”143 The treatise merely
posits that this may have been Congress’ intent, and aside from this
tentative interpretation, the treatise provides no other support for the
proposition or how the authors reached that conclusion.144
The other source the Bridgeport Court cites for support of its
statutory interpretation is a student-written law review note which provides
little analytical reasoning aside from making the same logical inference

140

See VMG Salsoul, 824 F.3d at 886.
Bridgeport Music, Inc. v. Dimension Films, 410 F.3d 792, 803 (6th Cir. 2005).
142
Id. at 803 n.18.
143
AL KOHN & BOB KOHN, KOHN ON MUSIC LICENSING, 1486-87 (Aspen Law &
Business 3d ed. 2002) (emphasis added).
144
Id.
141
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regarding § 114(b) of the Copyright Act that Bridgeport relies on.145 The
Note, written by Susan J. Latham, only cites for support of this
interpretation a lecture by law professor Justin Hughes.146 This is not to
imply that the student Note or Professor Hughes are not valid sources. The
problem, however, is that like with Kohn, there is no explanation available
to determine the logic or thought process of the statutory interpretation they
advocate, nor on what they based their own understanding of the Copyright
Act.147 Moreover, Latham herself acknowledges in a footnote that despite
this interpretation of § 114, de minimis may still be a valid defense, writing,
“[t]here may be the possibility of a de minimis use defense, depending on
how strictly the court interprets the ‘actual sounds’ language in the
statute.”148
This lack of secondary support, combined with the fact that the
Court’s interpretation rests on an inference which is not based in sound
logical reasoning and not maintained by the legislative history,
demonstrates that the Sixth Circuit’s arguments in Bridgeport are not
convincing. In contrast, the Ninth Circuit’s statutory interpretation of the
Copyright Act in VMG Salsoul is grounded in logical arguments, bolstered
by legislative history and adheres to the long-standing principles of
145

Bridgeport, 410 F.3d at 801 n.10; Latham, supra note 90, at 125.
Latham, supra note 90, at 125 n.33. Latham states in the footnote that her notes
from the lecture are “on file with the author.” Id.
147
Latham, supra note 90, at 125 n.33.
148
Latham, supra note 90, at 125 n.35; see also Carter, supra note 10, at 686–87.
146
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copyright law. Thus, the Ninth Circuit’s statutory interpretation is the more
persuasive argument.
2.

Distinguishing Sound Recordings from other Copyright Protected
Mediums
A key piece of reasoning behind the Bridgeport decision was the

Court’s dismissal of the legislative history of the Copyright Act.149 The
Court said it did so because copyright infringement via music sampling of
sound recordings was not being done, or at least was not a problem, in the
early 1970’s when the Copyright Act was written.150 This argument might
be persuasive if sampling music from a sound recording was demonstrably
different from other forms of copyright infringement. If sampling a sound
recording is somehow legally distinguishable from copying and reusing
work from other mediums, then dismissing the legislative intent—which
was written at a time when Congress could not have realistically foreseen
the type of widespread music sampling which began in the 1980’s—is at
least a reasonable proposition.151
The problem, however, is that there is no meaningful distinction
between taking a small portion of a sound recording and reusing it in

149

Bridgeport, 410 F.3d at 805.
Id.
151
In theory, this would be a meaningful distinction, because if Congress could not
have foreseen such events when drafting the Copyright Act of 1976 it follows that it would
not be helpful to refer to the legislative history as it will merely explain the thought process
behind the Act at a time when Congress was unaware and unprepared to deal with the type
of sampling at issue.
150
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another work, and taking a small portion of a photo, a video, or a drawing
and reusing that in another work.152 In other words, the distinction the
Bridgeport court attempts to make is an arbitrary one.153 This is the Ninth
Circuit’s argument in VMG Salsoul—that other copyright infringement
cases deal with “physical takings,” but are still subject to a substantial
similarity analysis, thus the Sixth Circuit’s reasoning is flawed.154
The Bridgeport Court argued that music sampling is a “physical
taking rather than an intellectual one.”155 However, a video recording

152

See, e.g., NIMMER & NIMMER supra note 10 at § 13.03 [A][2][b]. As Professor
Nimmer points out:
Whether the conduct at issue is sound duplication or sound imitation,
the defendant who would create a new work must fix materials into a
tangible medium of expression; a distinction based on “physical
copying” versus something else thus seems to be built on air. It is
therefore difficult to subscribe to the court’s conclusion that sampling
represents “a physical taking rather than an intellectual one.”
Id. See also Galvin, supra note 10, at 537–38; Schietinger, supra note 10, at 239–44.
153
See NIMMER & NIMMER supra note 10 at § 13.03 [A][2][b] (arguing Bridgeport’s
premise that sampling involves a physical, rather than intellectual taking based on the fact
that sounds are “fixed in the medium” appears to be “built on air”). Outside of the
Bridgeport decision, this distinction is not found in any other case law and is supported by
very little. See, e.g., Galvin, supra note 10, at 537–38 (“If digital sampling is considered a
physical taking from the sound recording, then why is it not also one from the musical
composition (which the sound recording contains)? Both copyrights require that the work
be fixed in a tangible medium; a musical score on paper is certainly no less tangible than a
compact disc. At best, the court's distinction between taking from a sound recording and
taking from the musical composition is unconvincing.”); Schietinger, supra note 10, at
239–44 (“The Sixth Circuit improperly describes sampling as a physical rather than
intellectual taking”); but see Reilly, supra note 50, at 362 (arguing in favor of the
Bridgeport decision and stating that prior to Bridgeport, “neither sampling musicians nor
sampled musicians were protected sufficiently by these laws and music industry
practices”), and VMG Salsoul, LLC v. Ciccone, 824 F.3d 871, 889 (9th Cir. 2016)
(Silverman, B., dissenting) (arguing that Bridgeport’s arguments are “well-reasoned and
persuasive,” noting Congress’ silence after the decision and stating that “[o]nce the sound
is fixed, it is tangible property belonging to the copyright holder, and no one else has the
right to take even a little of it without permission”).
154
See VMG Salsoul, 824 F.3d at 885.
155
Bridgeport, 410 F.3d at 802.
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contains sounds and images which are also “fixed in the medium”156 when
the recording is made, just as the sounds of the musical instruments are in a
sound recording. Likewise, as the Ninth Circuit asserts, the images in a
photograph are “fixed in the medium” when the photograph is captured,
printed and reused.157 Therefore, whether it is a photograph, a piece of
recorded music, or a video clip which is copied and reused by the alleged
infringer, there is no sound logical argument as to why any of these
mediums should be treated differently.158 Moreover, as the Ninth Circuit
points out, there is no distinction drawn between these mediums in the
Copyright Act itself.159
It appears the Bridgeport court incorrectly focused on the fact that
the copying done in sampling is exact, rather than focusing on what is more
important in the context of the case: is the portion copied significant enough
to constitute substantial similarity to the original work?160 Thus, the fact that
copyright infringement was not taking place through music sampling in the

156

Id.
VMG Salsoul, 824 F.3d at 885.
158
As an example, imagine one were to take an exact copy of Lewis Hine’s iconic
photograph “Sitting Atop a Skyscraper,” and then use a tiny, unrecognizable portion of it in
a collage or another work of art. Even if that person freely admitted they had physically
copied the piece from Hine’s photograph, unless the portion of the work they took from the
photograph is recognizable to the average person, it is very likely that the copying would
be considered de minimis and thus, not actionable, if one follows the holdings of the courts
aside from Bridgeport. See supra note 153. How this example of reusing a small
unrecognizable portion of a photograph in another work is different from taking a tiny,
unrecognizable portion of a song and reusing it in another song is hard to follow.
159
See supra note 105.
160
NIMMER & NIMMER supra note 10 at § 13.03 [E][1].
157
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1970’s is irrelevant; copyright infringement was taking place in various
other forums of copyright law at the time, including various other types of
“physical takings” from other mediums, and the same principles of
substantial similarity applied in those matters.161 Therefore, the Ninth
Circuit’s reasoning that there is no meaningful distinction between sampling
and other forms of copyright infringement is logically sound, and the better
argument.
3.

Policy Arguments
While Bridgeport’s policy arguments162 seem well-reasoned, as the

Ninth Circuit argues in VMG Salsoul, courts are directed to interpret
Congress’ intent to the best of their abilities.163 On its face, ease of

161

See, e.g., Sandoval v. New Line Cinema Corp., 147 F.3d 215, 216 (2d Cir. 1998)
(finding the defendant's use of exact reproductions of plaintiff's photographs in the movie
“Seven” was de minimis because the plaintiff’s photographs “as used in the movie are not
displayed with sufficient detail for the average lay observer to identify even the subject
matter of the photographs, much less the style used in creating them”); Vault Corp. v.
Quaid Software, Ltd., 847 F.2d 255, 267–68 (5th Cir. 1988) (finding the 30 character
sequence copied by defendant out of 50 pages of software source coding “constituted a
quantitatively minor amount” and was thus de minimis); Toulmin v. Rike-Kumler Co., 137
U.S.P.Q. 533, 534–35 (S.D. Ohio 1962) (finding defendant's copying of one sentence and
half of another from plaintiff's historical book and subsequent reuse in his novel to be de
minimis because the defendant’s use of such a small portion of plaintiff’s book “represents
neither a substantial nor material part of the latter,” and “was insignificant in value and
extent of the copyrighted material”).
162
See discussion supra Part II. 1. C.
163
See VMG Salsoul, 824 F.3d at 887. See also John F. Manning, Textualism and
Legislative Intent, 91 VA. L. REV. 419, 419 (2005). The author notes:
For much of our history, the Supreme Court has unflinchingly
proclaimed that legislative “intent” is the touchstone of federal statutory
interpretation. The rationale is familiar: In a constitutional system
predicated upon legislative supremacy (within constitutional boundaries),
judges—as Congress’s faithful agents—must try to ascertain as
accurately as possible what Congress meant by the words it used.
Id.
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enforcement sounds like a useful judicial improvement, but it is not
necessarily an improvement at all if the method used to accomplish this
goal does not comport with copyright case law and congressional intent. If
Congress truly intended that sound recordings be treated the same as all
other mediums in regards to copyright protection as the legislative history
suggests,164 then policy arguments made by judges should not override the
legislature’s intent, as the Supreme Court established in SEC v. Joiner.165
When dealing with a case involving interpreting federal statutes such as the
Copyright Act, the Federal Circuit Courts are not to ignore legislative intent
and insert their own policy arguments, they are to interpret the desire of the
legislature and decide the case according to that rationale.166 Thus, the
Federal courts should aim for fidelity in interpreting Congressional intent,
and because the Ninth Circuit’s argument is consistent with Congress’
intent, it is more persuasive.167

164

See discussion supra Part II. 1. C.
SEC v. Joiner, 320 U.S. 344, 350-51 (1943). The Supreme Court noted that the
federal courts are to decipher to the best of their ability the legislature’s intent when
attempting to interpret federal statutes:
However well these rules may serve at times to aid in deciphering
legislative intent, they long have been subordinated to the doctrine that
courts will construe the details of an act in conformity with its
dominating general purpose, will read text in the light of context and will
interpret the text so far as the meaning of the words fairly permits so as to
carry out in particular cases the generally expressed legislative policy.
Id.
166
See Manning, supra note 163, at 419 n.1. See also Joiner, 320 U.S. at 350-51;
VMG Salsoul, LLC v. Ciccone, 824 F.3d 871, 887 (9th Cir. 2016). The Ninth Circuit
points out that Bridgeport’s policy arguments “are for a legislature, not a court. They speak
to what Congress could decide; they do not inform what Congress actually decided.” Id.
167
See note 178 infra.
165
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Comparing the Holdings and Their Effects
Because the Sixth Circuit’s arguments discussed above are

unconvincing and the Ninth Circuit’s contrary arguments are logical,
grounded in established copyright case law and comport with the legislative
intent available for the Copyright Act, the Ninth Circuit’s holding in VMG
Salsoul is superior. The effect of Bridgeport’s bright line rule on music
sampling litigants since 2005 is unclear, in part because there are so few
sampling cases which have made it to trial.168 However, the implication of
holding that any sampling is per se copyright infringement is fairly clear: it
gives the music publishing companies the upper hand in negotiating
sampling licenses and discourages artists from sampling other musical
works without getting a license.169
In contrast, the Ninth Circuit’s holding, which requires courts ruling
on music sampling infringement cases to do a substantial similarity and de
minimis analysis, at least in theory, should help to readjust the balance

168

Suppappola, supra note 9, at 125.
See Schietinger supra note 10 at 234; see also Thomas P. Wolf, Toward a “New
School” Licensing Regime for Digital Sampling: Disclosure, Coding, and Click-Through,
2011 STAN. TECH. L. REV. 1, 9 (2011) (“Bridgeport, if generalized into a nationally
applicable standard for sampling, will dramatically increase the transaction costs associated
with sampling, forcing artists to acquire both musical composition and sound recording
licenses for all their samples, regardless of whether or not such samples would have
previously been held to constitute non-infringing uses.”); Steven D. Kim, Taking De
Minimis out of the Mix: The Sixth Circuit Threatens to Pull the Plug on Digital Sampling in
Bridgeport Music, Inc. v. Dimension Films, 13 JEFFREY S. MOORAD SPORTS L.J. 103, 130–
31 (2006) (Noting that “[s]hould the Supreme Court similarly deny certiorari in Bridgeport,
musicians will face both costly and complex licenses for samples, or potentially face
equally costly litigation—which will, in effect, pull the plug on digital sampling.”).
169
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between artist creativity and artist protection by creating room for artists to
use small samples of other works without mandating artists engage in the
complex and expensive sample clearing process.170 How the use of a de
minimis analysis might impact the filing of sampling infringement lawsuits
is also unclear, because while it may encourage artists to take more risks in
sampling without obtaining a license, which could increase litigation, it
could also discourage music publishing companies from bringing
infringement cases when the alleged copying is of a small portion of the
work if courts find sampling uses to be de minimis.
However, with VMG Salsoul and Bridgeport coming to opposite
conclusions in their holdings, one thing is clear: the resulting circuit split
will subject litigants to diametrically opposed rules of law in the Ninth and
Sixth Circuits.171 From the litigant’s perspective, this clearly incentivizes
forum shopping,172 something Congress and the courts have sought to
reduce as much as possible.173
170

See Kembrew McLeod & Peter DiCola, Non-Infringing Uses in Digital Sampling:
The Role of Fair Use and the De Minimis Threshold in Sample Clearance Reform, 17
DEAKIN L. REV. 322, 323–24 (2013) (arguing that “the de minimis threshold allows
musicians a certain freedom to borrow small building blocks,” and that “[t]he absence of
the de minimis rule for sound recordings has broad consequences . . . . However
implemented, a de minimis threshold should apply to the infringement of sound recordings
to provide leeway in copyright law’s balancing act between those who sample and those
who have been sampled.”).
171
84 U.S.L.W. 1826 (2016); Lesley Grossberg, A Circuit Split at Last: Ninth Circuit
Recognizes De Minimis Exception to Copyright Infringement of Sound Recordings,
BAKERHOSTETLER (last visited Nov. 3, 2016).
172
Grossberg, supra note 171. If a copyright license holder wants to sue an alleged
infringer over the use of a sample of the copyright protected song, it would clearly be in
their best interest to file suit in the Sixth Circuit, as the Sixth Circuit is bound to follow
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Unresolved Issues
Both the VMG Salsoul and Bridgeport opinions still leave several

issues unresolved. First, an underlying “slippery slope” problem remains in
arguably all substantial similarity and de minimis determinations made by
courts.174 These determinations can be particularly challenging in the
context of music sampling.175 In addition, while there is debate on whether
the real driving factor behind the Bridgeport opinion’s bright line rule was

Bridgeport’s bright-line “get a license or do not sample” rule. Id. Therefore any sampling,
if proved, is per se infringement; thus all the plaintiff has to do is show that her work was
actually copied and she wins the case, like in Bridgeport. Bridgeport, 410 F.3d at 801–05.
Conversely, the defendant in such a suit would have the incentive to do whatever it can to
avoid the Sixth Circuit and attempt to get the suit heard in the Ninth Circuit or in another
federal circuit where the lower district courts have declined to follow Bridgeport, like the
Second or Eleventh Circuits, which have employed a substantial similarity analysis. See
Batiste v. Najm, 28 F. Supp. 3d 595, 625 n.52 (E.D. La. 2014) (using substantial similarity
test); Saregama India Ltd. v. Mosley, 687 F. Supp. 2d 1325, 1338–41 (S.D. Fla. 2009)
(applying substantial similarity test). This would require the plaintiff prove not only
copying, but copying of a legally substantial portion of her work. See discussion supra Part
I.
173
See Debra Lyn Bassett, The Forum Game, 84 N.C. L. REV. 333, 336–37 (2005)
(noting that “[n]o less an authority than a United States Supreme Court Justice has
denounced forum shopping as ‘evil.’ Congressional efforts to limit forum shopping have
portrayed the practice as abusive, devious, and unethical.”).
174
Bridgeport Music, Inc. v. Dimension Films, 230 F. Supp. 2d 830, 840 (M.D.
Tenn. 2002). The District Court in the Bridgeport case pointed out that “[t]he Court's role
in making a de minimis analysis is a tricky one. It must balance the interests protected by
the copyright laws against the stifling effect that overly rigid enforcement of these laws
may have on the artistic development of new works.” See also NIMMER & NIMMER supra
note 10 at § 13.03 [A]. Professor Nimmer points out that “[t]he determination of the extent
of similarity that will constitute a substantial, and hence infringing, similarity presents one
of the most difficult questions in copyright law, and one that is the least susceptible of
helpful generalizations.” Id.
175
Suppappola, supra note 9 at 100–01. For example: where exactly is the legal
threshold of de minimis when it comes to music sampling? Is it an arbitrary length—i.e. the
cutoff for de minimis use is two seconds? Is it based on whether the “average listener”
would recognize it? If so, how exactly does a judge or a panel of justices make a definitive
ruling, as a matter of law, that an “average listener” would not recognize the sampled piece
in the song? See infra Part III.
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judicial economy,176 clogging the courts remains a potential issue.177 If
courts are to apply a substantial similarity in every sampling case, it is not
hard to see why having to do so for hundreds of cases would be draining on
court resources.178 Yet another issue in this circuit split is that neither
Bridgeport nor the Ninth Circuit addressed the argument of fair use in their
opinions.179 There appears to be little to no case law regarding whether fair

176

Bridgeport Music, Inc. v. Dimension Films, 410 F.3d 792, 802 (6th Cir. 2005).
The Bridgeport Court stresses that they did not create a bright line rule simply for the sake
of judicial efficiency, writing, “[w]e would want to emphasize, however, that
considerations of judicial economy are not what drives this opinion.” Id. But see Carter,
supra note 10, at 681–84 (noting that “[t]he appeals court unconvincingly stressed judicial
economy failed to dictate its rule,” and that “judicial economy seems to have driven
Bridgeport’s bright-line rule”).
177
The Bridgeport court was presented with nearly 500 instances of unlicensed
sampling by the music clearinghouse Bridgeport Music Incorporated and related music
publishing companies. Bridgeport, 410 F.3d at 795. Unlike in Newton v. Diamond, another
seminal copyright sampling case, where the Ninth Circuit dealt with a single instance of
sampling in one song, the Bridgeport case presented the Court with several hundred
infringement claims by one clearinghouse against dozens of alleged infringers. Newton v.
Diamond, 388 F.3d 1189, 1190 (9th Cir. 2004); Bridgeport, 410 F.3d at 795. It should be
noted for purposes of distinguishing, that Newton dealt with an alleged infringement of a
sample in regards to a musical composition, not a sound recording, which are
distinguishable under copyright law, as discussed in Part I, supra. Id. For a discussion of
the differences between the two, see generally Landau, supra note 45.
178
Bridgeport, 410 F.3d at 802. The court points out that “[w]hen one considers that
he has hundreds of other cases all involving different samples from different songs, the
value of a principled bright-line rule becomes apparent.” Id. This is an important piece of
context because it may go a long way towards explaining the underlying reasoning behind
the court’s decision to create a “bright line” rule. In the next sentence, however, the court
attempts to distance itself from the idea that they created the bright line rule simply for
economy, noting, “[w]e would want to emphasize, however, that considerations of judicial
economy are not what drives this opinion. If any consideration of economy is involved it is
that of the music industry.” Id. See also Carter, supra note 10, at 681–84 (noting that “[t]he
appeals court unconvincingly stressed judicial economy failed to dictate its rule,” and that
“judicial economy seems to have driven Bridgeport’s bright-line rule”).
179
While the VMG Salsoul Court was not faced with that issue because they found
the alleged infringement to be de minimis, the Bridgeport Court declined to address that
argument, though the defendant raised it. Bridgeport, 410 F.3d at 805. See also supra note
69.
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use might apply as a valid defense to music sampling cases,180 and this is
particularly troublesome because the body of copyright infringement case
law on music sampling itself is not very robust.181
III. PROPOSAL
In order to provide helpful dialogue in the face of the current circuit
split, this section proposes three suggestions for courts faced with deciding
similar cases. First, courts should follow the Ninth Circuit’s reasoning and
continue to perform substantial similarity analyses for music sampling
cases. Second, this section proposes courts use a modified version of the
“audience test” to determine a minimum threshold for substantial similarity
in sampling cases in order to address the issue of judicial economy in the
face of potentially increased music sampling litigation. Lastly, this section
proposes that courts should also be receptive to analyzing fair use defenses
by defendants in music sampling cases.
A. Sampling Cases Should Require A Substantial Similarity Analysis
Looking through the lens of copyright law, the Ninth Circuit’s
holding in VMG Salsoul is the proper analysis for courts when dealing with
a music sampling case.182 The Ninth Circuit’s arguments are generally well
grounded in logic and decades of copyright law, and do not suffer from the

180

Suppappola, supra note 9, at 125.
Id. at 95. Since 2006 when Suppappola’s article was written, only a handful of
additional cases on music sampling have been published. See supra note 11.
182
See discussion supra Part II. C.
181
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types of flaws in reasoning that Bridgeport does.183 Applying a substantial
similarity and de minimis analysis to music sampling copyright
infringement cases as the Ninth Circuit did in VMG Salsoul comports with
long-standing copyright law principles, Congress’ legislative intent, and the
long line of cases which have followed those principles.184 Thus, when faced
with a copyright infringement lawsuit involving music sampling, courts
should continue to apply a substantial similarity analysis, including
analyzing potential de minimis defenses.185
Addressing one of the unresolved issues raised above, while judicial
economy is still a problem, as pointed out by copyright scholars, this is not
an issue that can be easily solved and generally requires a case-by-case
determination.186 Bridgeport’s rationale behind its bright line test for judicial
economy disregards the fact that most copyright infringement actions are
subject to a substantial similarity test and courts have so far managed to
handle the load.187 Regardless, when faced with such a situation, as
183

See discussion supra Part II. C.
See discussion supra Part II. C 1–4.
185
See discussion supra Part I; Part II. C.
186
See NIMMER & NIMMER supra note 10 at § 13.03 [A].
187
See, e.g. Newton v. Diamond, 388 F.3d 1189, 1192–95 (9th Cir. 2004) (using the
substantial similarity test to determine the defendant’s use of a six-second, three-note flute
segment of plaintiff’s musical composition was de minimis and did not satisfy the
minimum constitutional standards for copyright protection and therefore not actionable as a
matter of law); Leigh v. Warner Bros., 212 F.3d 1210, 1215 (11th Cir. 2000) (finding
defendant’s film sequence not substantially similar to plaintiff’s work as a matter of law);
Sid & Marty Krofft TV Prods. v. McDonald's Corp., 562 F.2d 1157, 1167 (9th Cir. 1977)
(using “total concept and feel” variant of substantial similarity test to find defendants had
infringed on plaintiff’s copyright); Steward v. West, No. 13-02449, 2014 U.S. Dist. LEXIS
186012, *25–27 (C.D. Cal. Aug. 14, 2014) (applying substantial similarity test); Batiste v.
184
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inconvenient as it may be, judicial efficiency should not trump legislative
intent.188
B. An “Audience Test” To Determine A Minimum Threshold For
Substantial Similarity
The modified “audience test” proposed in this section seeks to deal
with those unresolved issues of judicial economy. In terms of what type of
substantial similarity test courts should apply, critics, scholars and courts
have proposed several variations, though many courts, including the Ninth
Circuit, use the so-called “audience test.”189 Some copyright scholars
criticize the test as not being faithful to the core tenants of the Copyright
Act because it allegedly disregards all but the outward expression of the
material.190 However, while the audience test is not perfect, it has been used

Najm, 28 F. Supp. 3d 595, 625 n.52 (E.D. La. 2014) (using substantial similarity test);
Saregama India Ltd. v. Mosley, 687 F. Supp. 2d 1325, 1338–41 (S.D. Fla. 2009) (applying
substantial similarity test); EMI Records Ltd. v. Premise Media Corp. L.P., 2008 N.Y.
Misc. LEXIS 7485 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. Aug. 8, 2008) (using substantial similarity test); see also
NIMMER & NIMMER supra note 10 at § 13.03 [A]. Granted, the Bridgeport court was faced
with nearly 500 separate infringement claims, but in the end, those were whittled down to
less than fifteen through pre-trial proceedings. Bridgeport Music, Inc. v. Dimension Films,
410 F.3d 792, 795 (6th Cir. 2005).
188
See discussion supra Part II. C.
189
See NIMMER & NIMMER supra note 10 at § 13.03 [E][1]. (“For over a century, the
courts in general have purported to apply what is called the ordinary observer or audience
test.”).
190
See id. at § 13.03 [A]. Nimmer argues “that the ‘spontaneous and immediate’
reactions of the ordinary observer are relevant evidence in determining the existence of
copying. There is, however, reason to dispute the doctrine insofar as it makes the visceral
reactions of the trier the ultimate test of copying (assuming access).” Nimmer goes on to
point out that “[t]he Copyright Act is intended to protect writers from the theft of the fruits
of their labor, not to protect against the general public’s ‘spontaneous and immediate’
impression that the fruits have been stolen.” The holding of the Supreme Court in Feist
appears to offer evidence to the contrary, however:
The primary objective of copyright is not to reward the labor of authors,
but “to promote the Progress of Science and useful Arts.” To this end,
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effectively by courts, and it could be adapted further in the context of music
sampling cases to help courts determine when a minimal level of substantial
similarity has been established.
The purpose of the modified audience test proposed in this section is
to address the judicial efficiency issue the Bridgeport court sought to
resolve with its bright line rule, while still allowing courts to comport with
the tenants of copyright law and the legislative intent behind the Copyright
Act. The test is designed specifically for pre-trial use in sampling cases and
courts may choose to use a more in-depth substantial similarity test for the
actual trial. But because pre-trial motions for summary judgment and their
equivalents play such a large role in the gatekeeping function of courts,191
and given the potential for large-scale sampling litigation as seen in
Bridgeport,192 a separate, efficient test for summary judgment would aid in

copyright assures authors the right to their original expression, but
encourages others to build freely upon the ideas and information
conveyed by a work. This principle, known as the idea/expression or
fact/expression dichotomy, applies to all works of authorship.
Feist Publ'ns, Inc. v. Rural Tel. Serv. Co., 499 U.S. 340, 349–50 (1991) (emphasis added)
(citations omitted). Thus on a basic level, the audience test, at least in the context of music
sampling, appears to comport with the general principles behind the Copyright Act as
determined by the Supreme Court in Feist. It should also be noted that Bridgeport dealt
with an undisputed sampling of plaintiff’s work. Bridgeport, 410 F.3d at 796. If the
sampling is disputed, however, the issue of whether the sampling artist has actually
sampled the work would require additional evidence to prove there was a copying of the
original work.
191
D. Theodore Rave, Questioning the Efficiency of Summary Judgment, 81 N.Y.U.
L. REV., 875, 877–78 (2006) (“The adoption of Rule 56 expanded the availability of the
motion to both parties in all types of actions, but its purpose remained the same. The
architects of the rule saw summary judgment as a way to reduce ‘law's delay’ and help
clear crowded court dockets.”).
192
See supra note 56.
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sorting cases which are viable from those which are not, while adhering to
the goals of copyright law.
The modified audience test proposed in this section would be used
pre-trial to determine whether an allegedly sampled portion of a song is
legally significant enough to sustain a cause of action for copyright
infringement. The proposed test seeks to create an analysis which is not as
technically daunting as a test like fragmented literal similarity,193 but one
that remains true to the goals of copyright protection as enumerated in
arguably the most helpful analysis the Supreme Court has given to date on
the boundaries of copyright protection, Feist Publications, Inc. v. Rural
Telephone Service Co.194
In Feist, the Supreme Court considered whether defendant’s copying
of telephone numbers and other facts from a competitor’s phone book
constituted copyright infringement.195 The Court explicitly rejected the
“sweat of the brow” argument many lower courts had been using for
decades to find infringement.196 The Supreme Court explained that the
Copyright Act “assures authors the right to their original expression, but
encourages others to build freely upon the ideas and information conveyed
193

See generally NIMMER & NIMMER supra note 10 at § 13.03 [A][1]–[2].
Cromer, supra note 10, at 283 (“Absent a directive from Congress, courts have
forged their own tests for copyright infringement, but again, without much guidance from
obvious sources. The clearest directive enunciated by the Supreme Court was when in Feist
Publications, Inc. v. Rural Telephone & Telegraph Co.”).
195
Feist, 499 U.S. at 342–44.
196
Id. at 352–57.
194
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by a work,” which the Court called the “idea/expression dichotomy.”197 The
Court noted that bare facts cannot be considered original expression, and
thus the reuse of an unoriginal expression will not be entitled to copyright
protection.198 The Court held that in order for a work to be protected by the
Copyright Act, originality is a key element and the work must contain a
“modicum of creativity” to transform something like bare facts into original
expression.199
Therefore, working off the premises from Feist, in the context of
music sampling it follows that the sampled portion in question must contain
a “modicum of creativity” in order to be an original expression that is
protected from copyright infringement.200 Thus, the 0.23 second “horn hit”
at issue in VMG Salsoul, being in essence a four-note, single-chord horn

197

Id. at 349–50. Indeed, underlying the core of copyright law are two competing
interests which must be balanced: protecting the copyright holder from plagiarism of his or
her work, and allowing sufficient room for new artists to build upon prior works towards
the goal of advancing the progress of science and art. Howard B. Abrams, Originality and
Creativity in Copyright Law, 55 L. & CONTEMP. PROBS. 3, 4–5 (1992); see also Pote, supra
note 17 at 642. The District Court in Bridgeport also recognized this balancing act, writing
in their opinion:
The Court recognizes that the fact of blatant copying is not
challenged by the defendant for the purposes of this motion, and that the
purposes of the copyright laws is to deter wholesale plagiarism of prior
works. However, a balance must be struck between protecting an artist's
interests, and depriving other artists of the building blocks of future
works. Since the advent of Western music, musicians have freely
borrowed themes and ideas from other musicians.
Bridgeport Music, Inc. v. Dimension Films, 230 F. Supp. 2d 830, 842 (M.D.
Tenn. 2002).
198
Feist, 499 U.S. at 350–51.
199
Id. at 362–63.
200
Id.
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part, likely does not meet this minimum creativity requirement.201 If it did,
virtually every individual horn note played could be entitled to copyright
protection, which would be an absurd result. Thus, the key question
becomes: how do courts determine when a sampled piece of music meets
the “modicum of creativity” requirement? The test proposed below seeks to
address this question.
The basic premise of the proposed test is: assuming there is evidence
of sampling, does the allegedly copied music sample constitute a copying of
constituent elements of the sampled work that are original, such that an
average listener would be able to recognize it as being a part of the original
work?
In applying the test, the crucial question becomes: is the sample
taken a sequence of music that an average listener would be able to
recognize as a pattern from the original song? If so, then the copied work
has met the threshold of being “original,” and is subject to copyright
protection because there is a minimal amount of substantial similarity, at
least enough to stave off a finding of being de minimis. If it is not, then the
portion copied does not meet the minimum standards for copyright
201

Jennifer R. R. Mueller, All Mixed Up: Bridgeport Music v. Dimension Films and
de minimis Digital Sampling, 81 IND. L. J., 435, 440–41 (2006) (“courts recognize that
there are a ‘limited number of notes and chords available to composers,’ and therefore
‘common themes frequently reappear in various compositions, especially in popular
music.’ Such common themes do not meet the minimum threshold for originality, in the
same way that a very simple sentence in English would not. Notes, like words, must be put
together in an original way that requires a modicum of creativity.”).
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protection and thus the sampling is de minimis and the action should be
dismissed.202
Though this may seem a bit tautological, the proposed test seeks to
more clearly define the audience test and create a more discernable line in a
very subjective area of the law. Ultimately, the substantial similarity
analysis essentially comes down to an exercise in line drawing,203 and this
proposed test seeks to simply help determine where the baseline should be
drawn by using an already-established form of the substantial similarity
test.204
Take, for example, music created by a guitar: if an artist plays one
note, is that an original expression that should be protected by copyright
law? Almost certainly not. What about one chord? Again, probably not. But
when an artist strings together a series of notes or chords, there is a point
when the combination of notes and their arrangement becomes unique. Part
of what defines that sequence of music as being unique is the ability of a
listener to recognize the sequence or pattern of its tune. If a listener hears

202

Courts could accomplish this in more than one way, however, the most obvious
choice would be to do a “side-by-side” comparison of the songs at issue. The court could
listen to the allegedly infringing sample, then to the original work and decide whether the
sample has replicated a portion of the original work which an average listener would be
able to recognize. By doing this kind of direct comparison, the court need not be familiar
with the original work to determine if the sample replicates a recognizable portion of it,
they merely need to be able to recognize the copied portion in the new work.
203
NIMMER & NIMMER supra note 10 at § 13.03 [A].
204
See NIMMER & NIMMER supra note 10 at § 13.03 [E][1]. (“For over a century, the
courts in general have purported to apply what is called the ordinary observer or audience
test.”).
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only a chord or two, they may recognize it as the sounds of a guitar, but
they likely would not recognize it as a part of a particular song. However,
when enough notes or chords are played in a particular sequence, or in such
a way as to make the sound unique, they become recognizable as something
more than just guitar sounds, they become a unique tune which the listener
can identify and which the listener would be able to recognize from the
original work. It is at this point that copyright protection should be applied.
Consider analogizing the situation to Feist: the individual guitar
notes or chords are like the facts (phone numbers) and their arrangement in
a sequence is a compilation of those facts (the arrangement of the
phonebook). This proposed test suggests that once the listener is able to
identify the series of notes or chords as a unique compilation recognizable
to the original work, it then satisfies the “modicum of creativity”
requirement as set forth in Feist.205 As with the various audience tests
currently employed by courts, this modified test could be used across the

205

Feist Publ'ns, Inc. v. Rural Tel. Serv. Co., 499 U.S. 340, 362–63 363 (1991).
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spectrum of music and musical instruments, including vocals,206 and
“looped” samples.207
Thus, this proposed audience test, tailored for pre-trial
determinations of whether allegedly sampled portions of songs are legally
significant enough to bring a cause of action for copyright infringement,
would comport with the guidelines of Feist and allow for the protection of
the original author’s unique expression as identified by an average listener.
This adheres to the core principle enumerated in Feist, that the author’s
expression, and not the fruit of the author’s labor—for example simply
playing a wholly unoriginal note or chord—should be protected.208

206

As another example, a woman singing the two words “I love” might not be
original enough to satisfy this test, but if a person were to sample Joan Jett’s vocal of those
two words from the famous song “I Love Rock N’ Roll,” the average listener would likely
identify the sample as being from Jett’s song, and thus substantial similarity would be
established. In this scenario it is the singer’s unique expression (Jett’s voice and her
tone)—not the words themselves—which the listener recognizes, and which is afforded
copyright protection, consistent with Feist. Feist, 499 U.S. at 349–50.
207
Many of the cases involving digital music sampling deal with short pieces of
sampled music which are then “looped” or repeated over and over in the new song; in two
of the more widely cited sampling cases, Bridgeport and Newton v. Diamond, the samples
at issue were both looped and modified. Bridgeport Music, Inc. v. Dimension Films, 410
F.3d 792, 796 (6th Cir. 2005); Newton v. Diamond, 388 F.3d 1189, 1192 (9th Cir. 2004).
In theory, “looping” a small sample would probably not meet the de minimis threshold of
the test proposed in this note, unless the looped sample is recognizable to the average
listener. While this may seem to some like a “loophole,” the core of the test is whether the
appropriation is recognizable to the average listener, which comports with the copyright
principles set forth in Feist by the Supreme Court. See discussion supra Part III, 2. For an
in-depth discussion of looping and de minimis (pre-Bridgeport), see Stephen R. Wilson,
Music Sampling Lawsuits: Does Looping Music Samples Defeat the De Minimis Defense?,
1 J. OF HIGH TECH. L. 179 (2002); see also Tonya M. Evans, Sampling, Looping, and
Mashing … Oh My!: How Hip Hop Music is Scratching More Than the Surface of
Copyright Law, 21 FORDHAM INTELL. PROP. MEDIA & ENT. L.J. 843 (2011).
208
Feist, 499 U.S. at 362–63.
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C. Fair Use
Finally, courts should be open to analyzing defendants’ claims of
fair use in sampling cases. It is unfortunate that neither Bridgeport nor VMG
Salsoul addressed fair use,209 because it could be another viable defense for
artists who sample. In general, analysis of the fair use doctrine as applied to
music sampling is lacking,210 thus, judicial decisions directly on that point
would be extremely useful. Recent cases like Lennon v. Premise Media
Corp.211 and Bill Graham Archives v. Dorling Kindersley Ltd.212 have held
that if the copied portion of a work is sufficiently “transformative” in nature
and does not appropriate a substantial portion of the original work, then the
taking is not copyright infringement under the fair use exception even when
the new use is commercial in nature.213 Additionally, the Second Circuit

209

See discussion supra Part II, 3.
See generally Landau, supra note 45; see also Suppappola, supra note 9 at 100–
01. There are few cases which deal with “fair use” and music sampling. Landau, supra note
45. Perhaps the closest case is Campbell v. Acuff-Rose Music, Inc., where the music group
2 Live Crew parodied the lyrics of Roy Orbison’s ballad “Pretty Woman” and were sued
for copyright infringement by the copyright owner; the action went all the way to the
Supreme Court. Campbell v. Acuff-Rose Music, Inc., 510 U.S. 569, 571–72 (1994). The
Supreme Court reversed the lower court’s ruling that because the use of the lyrics was for
commercial gain it did not constitute fair use. Id. at 572. The Court held that while a
parody's commercial character tends to weigh against a finding of fair use, it is only one of
the four statutory elements which should be weighed in a fair use analysis. See id. at 594.
The Court noted that the four factors laid out in the Copyright Act of 1976 are to be
explored and weighed together in light of copyright's purpose of promoting science and the
arts. Id. at 574–78.
211
Lennon v. Premise Media Corp., 556 F. Supp. 2d 310, 324 (S.D.N.Y. 2008)
212
Bill Graham Archives, LLC v. Dorling Kindersley Ltd., 386 F. Supp. 2d 324, 333
(S.D.N.Y. 2005)
213
See e.g. Lennon, 556 F. Supp. 2d at 324 (S.D.N.Y. 2008) (finding the use of
plaintiff’s music in defendant’s work transformative because it was being used to criticize
the plaintiff’s song, even though the new work was partially commercial in nature); Bill
Graham Archives, 386 F. Supp. 2d at 333 (S.D.N.Y. 2005) (finding the defendant’s use of
210
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Court of Appeals has held that “[t]he ultimate test of fair use . . . is whether
the copyright law’s goal of promoting the Progress of Science and useful
Arts would be better served by allowing the use than by preventing it.”214
Moreover, in a 2013 decision, the Second Circuit held that there is no
requirement that the new work comment on the original work or its author,
only that the new use of the original work be sufficiently transformative,
opening the door for a broader interpretation and application of fair use as
an affirmative defense.215
In many sampling cases, the portion of the work used is edited and
sometimes “looped,” and then inserted into another song to create a new
musical composition.216 It is hard to predict how courts might rule,

Grateful Dead posters in his coffee table book to be fair use despite the commercial nature
of his venture because they were sufficiently transformative and were part of a biography
work on the band).
214
Castle Rock Entm't, Inc. v. Carol Publ'g Grp., Inc., 150 F.3d 132, 141 (2d Cir.
1998).
215
Cariou v. Prince, 714 F.3d 694, 705 (2d Cir. 2013) (“The law imposes no
requirement that a work comment on the original or its author in order to be considered
transformative, and a secondary work may constitute a fair use even if it serves some
purpose other than those (criticism, comment, news reporting, teaching, scholarship, and
research) identified in the preamble to the statute. Instead, as the Supreme Court as well as
decisions from our court have emphasized, to qualify as a fair use, a new work generally
must alter the original with ‘new expression, meaning, or message.’”).
216
See discussion supra note 207. For a more in-depth discussion on whether music
created by or with samples from other songs is in essence its own form of creativity and
expression which should be protected, see Evans, supra note 207 at 846 (arguing that
sampling and looping are the creative processes which “are the hallmark of the type of
creativity and innovation born out of the hip hop music tradition,” but that current
copyright law “fails to acknowledge the historical role, informal norms and value of
borrowing, cumulative creation and citation in music”); see also Pote supra note 17 at 642
(arguing that copyright law “must balance the interests of current artists and the interests of
future artists, and that mashup remixers seem to qualify as future artists under the
Copyright Act”). But see Emily Harper Music Mashups: Testing the Limits of Copyright
Law as Remix Culture Takes Society by Storm, 39 HOFSTRA L. REV. 405, 406 (2010)

2017] SPLIT CHORDS: ADDRESSING THE FEDERAL CIRCUIT

191

particularly because there has been little guidance from Congress or the
courts,217 but a valid argument could be made that the repurposing of a
sampled piece of music in a new song is “sufficiently transformative” to fall
under the fair use exception, even if the use is commercial in nature.218
Thus, fair use might be a valuable affirmative defense for sampling
musicians, especially if the sampling artist edited or modified the sampled
work.
CONCLUSION
The issues addressed in this Note are complex, and music-sampling
cases will continue to pose a challenge for courts in the future. An analysis
of the two opinions shows there are several key flaws in the Bridgeport case
and that the historical approach taken by the Ninth Circuit in VMG Salsoul
is the preferable method. It is challenging to create a meaningful, objective
standard or bright line rule for how courts should deal with substantial

(arguing that “mashups constitute copyright infringement, and that mashup artists are not
entitled to the affirmative defense of fair use”).
217
See supra note 181.
218
See, e.g., Johnson, supra note 45 at 138 (arguing that the fair use doctrine “should
remain a viable defense to claims that sampling constitutes copyright infringement”);
Landau, supra note 45 at 17–18 (arguing that the fair use doctrine should be used in music
sampling cases and that the Compulsory License in Section 115 of the Copyright Act
should be expanded to include music sampling under the fair use exception); but see
Harper supra note 216 at 406 (arguing that “mashups constitute copyright infringement,
and that mashup artists are not entitled to the affirmative defense of fair use”).
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similarity. The modified audience test proposed in this Note seeks to offer
courts an efficient way of scrutinizing actionable cases from de minimis
cases via a straight-forward test which allows a case-by-case analysis of
substantial similarity following the guidelines of Feist.

